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Moral hazard occurs when people do not assume the full risk of an action or 
decision; they are not inclined to make a fully responsible or moral choice. Over the 
course of the last half-century, federal government involvement in providing disaster 
assistance has greatly expanded. With this expansion, many believe that in providing 
disaster assistance, the federal involvement limits risk reduction and contributes to the 
rise of a moral hazard. 
Flooding and flood-related hazards are the most prominent and significant hazards 
in the United States, accounting for the highest percentage of major disaster declarations 
and direct economic losses. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) aims to 
reduce the impact of flooding through hazard identification and risk assessment, 
floodplain management, and flood insurance.  
A study of the NFIP concludes that aspects of the program limit risk reduction, 
specifically the continued coverage of repetitive loss properties and use of subsidies to 
desensitize risk. Furthermore, the long-term sustainment and resilience of the program 
are compromised by failures of policymakers to adjust for catastrophic losses. 
Identification of these issues provides a framework for consideration of the unintended 
consequences of federal government involvement in providing disaster assistance.  
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Moral hazard is a concept that originated in the early insurance industry with 
broad application in economics, law, and policy debate. Moral hazard is defined as when 
people do not assume the full risk of an action or decision; people are not inclined to 
make a fully responsible or moral choice; how the redistribution of risk changes people’s 
behavior.1 Many commentators have asserted that government involvement in providing 
disaster assistance contributes to the rise of a moral hazard, thus limiting the incentive of 
people to reduce risk.2 This thesis seeks to explore how federal involvement in providing 
disaster assistance limits risk reduction and contributes to the rise of a moral hazard 
through a study of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
Flooding and flood-related hazards are the most prominent and significant hazards 
in the United States and account for the highest percentage of major disaster declarations 
and direct economic losses. The NFIP was created as a mitigation program with the goal 
of preventing future loss of life and property from the hazard of flooding. The NFIP 
consists of three main elements that include flood hazard identification and risk 
assessment, floodplain management, and flood insurance. As provided by Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “overall, the program reduces the socio-
economic impact of disasters by promoting the purchase and retention of general risk 
insurance, but also of flood insurance, specifically.”3 
While the NFIP has generally remained fiscally solvent for much of its history, 
the catastrophic losses associated with the impacts of 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2012 





1 David Rowell and Luke B. Connelly, “A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard,’” Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 79, no. 4 (2012): 1061.  
2 Carolyn Kousky and Leonard Shabman, “The Hazard of the Moral Hazard—Or Not,” Natural 
Hazards Observer XXXVII, no. 5 (2013): 1.  
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “The National Flood Insurance Program,” May 20, 2016, 
https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program.  
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unlikely to cover future catastrophic losses or repay the billions of dollars in debt.4 
Analysis of NFIP program elements that permit repetitive loss and provide flood 
insurance subsidies underscore policies to limit risk reduction. Furthermore, failures by 
policymakers to structure the NFIP for catastrophic losses constrains the sustainability of 
the program. 
In participating communities, the NFIP offers structural and content flood 
insurance coverages, with regulators identifying repetitive losses as a significant concern. 
FEMA data indicates that from 1978 through 2015, 3.8 percent of policyholders have 
filed for repetitive losses, accounting for a disproportionate 35.5 percent of flood loss 
claims and 30.5 percent of claim payments.5 FEMA estimates that 90 percent of 
repetitive loss properties receive pre-flood insurance rate map (FIRM) or grandfathered 
subsidies.6 Moreover, NFIP policies specifically prevent FEMA from refusing coverage 
to any policyholder, and FEMA cannot compel property owners to mitigate losses or 
impose actuarial rates on repetitive loss properties as a penalty.7  
The majority of flood insurance policies are based on full-risk rates established 
through FEMA’s annual NFIP actuarial rate review. However, approximately 20 percent 
of policies are based on pre-FIRM subsidized or grandfathered insurance rates and pay 40 
to 45 percent of the full-risk premium needed to fund the long-term expectation of loss.8 
Congress authorized the use of subsidized flood insurance rates to encourage 
participation and prohibits unfairly penalizing homeowners who built before the 
___________________ 
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Forgone Premiums Cannot Be Measured and FEMA 
Should Validate and Monitor Data System Changes (GAO-15-111) (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667413.pdf, 2. 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Policy & Claim Statistics for Flood Insurance,” June 7, 
2016, https://www.fema.gov/policy-claim-statistics-flood-insurance; Federal Emergency Management 
Agency Region VI, FEMA NFIP Repetitive Loss Report (Denton, TX: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Region VI, 2016).  
6 Rawle O. King, National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges, and Financial Status 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40650.pdf, 
18. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
8 Thomas L. Hayes and D. Andrew Neal, National Flood Insurance Program Actuarial Rate Review: 
In Support of the Recommended October 1, 2011 Rate and Rule Changes (Washington DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2011), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1809-25045-
6893/actuarial_rate_review2011.pdf, 9, 34. 
 xvii
participation and prohibits unfairly penalizing homeowners who built before the 
government completed the assessment of flood risk.9 NFIP policies exempt pre-FIRM 
properties from compliance with floodplain management regulations unless they are 
substantially damaged or undergo substantial improvement.10 The continued coverage of 
repetitive loss properties and the subsidizing of flood insurance policies represents one of 
the clearest and most obvious indicators of the NFIP limiting risk reduction and 
contributing to the rise of a moral hazard. 
The NFIP is not structured to withstand claims and losses associated with 
catastrophic flood events; it relies on the borrowing authority with the U.S. Treasury to 
cover excessive losses.11 Significant loss events currently average 64 percent of claims 
and 84 percent of losses for the NFIP. The impact of significant loss events is clearly a 
threat to the long-term sustainment of the NFIP. Policymakers must address the fiscal 
challenges facing the program, placing it on a sounder financial framework to allow for 
improved management of the program when faced with significant loss events. The 
shortcomings of policymakers in addressing the sustainment of the NFIP presents a 
parallel argument that there is moral hazard in the current policymaking environment. It 
can be argued that when policymakers limit the sustainability of the NFIP to historical 
average losses versus catastrophic losses, they fail to provide for the long-term resilience 
of the program. 
In conclusion, aspects of the NFIP limit risk reduction and contribute to the rise of 
a moral hazard. Specifically, NFIP policies that support continued coverage of repetitive 
loss, use of subsidies to desensitize risk, and failure to adjust for catastrophic losses all 
impact the sustainability and resilience of the program. These findings have important 
consequences for the broader domain of evaluating the unintended consequences of  
—————————— 
9 Rawle O. King, Federal Flood Insurance: The Repetitive Loss Problem (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32972.pdf, 14. 
10 “Substantial Damages and Substantial Improvements,” YouTube video, posted by Gary Taylor, 
October 15, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wt3lMwCRhd0&list=PLADFiMUo5Nk7 
ajNQxa8N5s9G1IJ4gRrsZ&index=3.  
11 Carolyn Kousky and Leonard Shabman, Pricing Flood Insurance: How and Why the NFIP Differs 
from a Private Insurance Company (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 2014), 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-37.pdf, 9. 
 xviii
federal involvement in providing disaster assistance. While there is an imperative for the 
government to provide assistance in time of crisis, it is important to evaluate the how that 
assistance may change behavior; policies designed to limit risk may be actually prolong 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To what extent is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) limiting risk 
reduction behavior? 
What does this tell us about how federal government involvement in disaster 
assistance might be contributing to the rise of a moral hazard? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Over the course of the last half century, the federal government has undertaken an 
ever-increasing role in providing disaster assistance. A review of our history shows that 
federal intervention in disaster recovery before the Great Depression was essentially non-
existent and consisted mainly of expressions of sympathy but little financial aid.1 Since 
that time, federal involvement in financing recovery has increased to absorbing 
approximately 60 percent of recovery costs.2 Has the trend of greater federal involvement 
in disaster assistance given rise to a moral hazard that has resulted in a disincentive to 
minimize risk? 
Moral hazard is a term adopted by the insurance industry. It refers to how the 
redistribution of risk changes a person’s behavior. When people do not assume the full 
risk of an action or decision, they are not inclined to make a fully responsible or moral 
choice.3 Related to federal involvement in disaster assistance, moral hazard occurs when 
the public expects the government to intervene to provide recovery from the disaster, 
regardless of whether they have implemented strategies to minimize risk. As Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia opined, “The governmentalization of charity affects not just 
                                                 
1 Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington 
DC: Island Press, 1999), Kindle ed., 1.  
2 Elizabeth Witham and Steve Bowen, Financing Recovery from Catastrophic Events: Final Report 
(Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute, 2007), 
https://recoverydiva.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/financing_recovery_hsi-2007.pdf, v.   
3 David Rowell and Luke B. Connelly, “A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard,’” Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 79, no. 4 (2012): 1061.  
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the donor, but also the recipient… The transformation of charity into legal entitlement 
has produced donors without love and recipients without gratitude.”4 Justice Scalia’s 
viewpoint of how charity is negatively affected when it is institutionalized clearly reflects 
his Protestant ethics. 
In an article for Homeland Security Affairs, Naomi Zack presents a counter-
application of government’s role in disasters based on the social contract theory. She 
states:  
If property is privately owned or owned by the local community, 
government does not owe restitution to citizens who have lost their 
property or had it destroyed. But as part of government’s benevolence, it is 
appropriate that it offer some compensation in those cases, much as a good 
neighbor might.5 
She further expounds that according to Rousseau’s principle of common good, “part of 
government is to further what is good for society as a whole, in ways that are not 
necessarily decided by majority rule, or that amount to the greatest well-being of the 
greatest number.”6 Theories such as these present a view that emergency preparedness is 
a fundamental obligation of government that should motivate new policies.7 The question 
remains though, has disaster recovery, once the domain of charity, become an entitlement 
for people with little emphasis on personal responsibility or is it a fundamental obligation 
of government? 
The role that expanded federal disaster assistance plays in creating a moral hazard 
may best be displayed through the NFIP. According to Hayes and Neal, “Floods have 
been, and continue to be, the nation’s most destructive natural hazard in terms of 
                                                 
4 Antonin Scalia, “Is Capitalism or Socialism More Conducive to Christian Virtue?” [video], Lanier 
Theological Library, September 6, 2013, http://www.laniertheologicallibrary.org/videos/, 23:23.  
5 Naomi Zack, “Philosophy and Disaster,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, article 5 (2006), 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/176.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
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economic loss and life-threatening events.”8 From 1978 through 2015, the NFIP has 
provided total payments of more than $52 billion, and repeat losses accounted for a third 
of NFIP flood insurance payments.9 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was designed to establish a 
comprehensive risk management program to:  
(1) reduce suffering and economic losses due to floods through the 
purchase of flood insurance; (2) promote state and local land-use controls 
to guide development away from flood-prone areas; and (3) reduce federal 
expenditures for disaster assistance and flood control.10  
As Rawle King states, “The NFIP does not operate on the traditional insurance definition 
of fiscal solvency.”11 This is largely based on the NFIP providing insurance subsidies and 
grandfathered rates for properties that were constructed prior to the assessment of risk. In 
the event that premium and investment income is inadequate, the NFIP borrows funds 
from the U.S. Treasury to cover the losses with clauses for repayment. 
The long-term fiscal soundness of the NFIP is questionable, mainly due to 
extensive flood insurance claims associated with the hurricane impacts in the mid-2000s, 
especially hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Sandy in 2012.12 As of December 31, 
2014, FEMA owed the Treasury $23 billion.13 The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12) contained provisions to strengthen the solvency of the 
                                                 
8 Thomas L. Hayes and D. Andrew Neal, National Flood Insurance Program [NFIP] Actuarial Rate 
Review: In Support of the Recommended October 1, 2011 Rate and Rule Changes (Washington DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1809-
25045-6893/actuarial_rate_review2011.pdf, 1.  
9 National Flood Insurance Program Bureau Net, “Loss Statistics Country-wide as of 07/31/2016,” 
July 31, 2016, http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1040.htm; Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and 
Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington DC: Island Press, 1999), Kindle ed., 38.  
10 Rawle O. King, Federal Flood Insurance: The Repetitive Loss Problem (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32972.pdf, 1.  
11 Ibid., 7.  
12 National Research Council, Affordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums (Report 
1) (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2015), doi:10.17226/21709, 15.  
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO-15-290) (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf.  
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program by, among other things, phasing out almost all discounted premiums.14 
However, political resolve to address financial shortcomings of the NFIP was short-lived; 
the passage of the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA) 
reinstated a majority of subsidies on primary residences and slowed down rate increases 
for a majority of policies impacted by the reform provisions of BW-12.15 
The NFIP is symbolic of decades of flawed national disaster policy that now 
focuses on maintaining the status quo rather than rebuilding to prevent the next disaster.16 
As Joseph Scanlon points out,  
If change is to happen, it must come quickly. As each day passes, support for 
dramatic action will weaken. That means that development plans must be ready 
before disaster strikes. A disaster is not just a calamity but an opportunity, and a 
manager who is prepared can use it to alter the public agenda.17 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis started with an exploration of the expansion of federal involvement in 
disaster recovery over the course of the last half century. The research introduced the 
concept of moral hazard and its application to disaster recovery. As applied in the disaster 
research, moral hazard is the expectation that government will provide recovery from the 
disaster, regardless of whether people have implemented risk reduction strategies. A 
further exploration of disaster research has identified that the concept of moral hazard has 
broad application as an inevitable byproduct of expanded government involvement in 
disaster recovery. 
                                                 
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Biggert Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: 
Impact of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Changes [factsheet] (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1909-25045-
0554/bw12_sec_205_207_factsheet4_13_2013.pdf.  
15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act: 
Overview (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396551935597-
4048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf.  
16 Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (Washington 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), Kindle ed., 1275.   
17 T. Joseph Scanlon, “Reaching Out: Getting the Community Involved in Preparedness,” in 
Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government, ed. Thomas E. Drabek and 
Gerard J. Hoetmer (Washington DC: International City Management Association, 1991), 97.   
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While the concept of moral hazard resonates as a challenge to government 
involvement in disaster recovery, what is the extent of its impact on risk reduction 
behavior? Understanding the origins of the concept of moral hazard and its evolution as 
part of the lexicon of disaster research is key to further exploration of the issue. 
1. The Concept of Moral Hazard 
The origins of moral hazard are attributed to the early insurance industry, and 
aspects of the concept applied to economics, law, and policy debate. As provided within 
the insurance industry, when people do not assume the full risk of an action or decision, 
they are not inclined to make a fully responsible or moral choice.18 Economic literature 
expands on the concept, providing that the redistribution of risk changes people’s 
behavior; “the tendency for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or 
minimize the cost of loss.”19 Writing in the Journal of Risk and Insurance, Rowell and 
Connelly explain, “the term ‘moral hazard’ when interpreted literally has a strong 
rhetorical tone, which has been used by stakeholders to influence public attitudes to 
insurance.”20 
Some authors have taken the social responsibility aspects of the concept to task. 
In Tom Baker’s article “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” he explores the concept of 
moral hazard as an analytical tool applied to social responsibility questions. He asks, “To 
what extent are those that suffer responsible for their condition?”21 Baker also asks, 
“What obligations do we have to prevent or alleviate the suffering of others?”22  
Baker highlights in an editorial by James Glassman, who states, “What moral 
hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of bad behavior, then you 
encourage that bad behavior. The lesson of moral hazard is that less is more.”23 
                                                 
18 Rowell and Connelly, “A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard,’” 1061. 
19 Tom Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” Texas Law Review 75, no. 2 (1996): 239.  
20 Rowell and Connelly, “A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard,’” 1051.  
21 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 237.  
22 Ibid.  
23 James K. Glassman, “Drop Budget Fight, Shift to Welfare,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 11, 
1996, Five Star Lift ed., sec. editorial; Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 238.  
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Economist-politician Dick Armey further described this concept as “social responsibility 
is a euphemism for personal irresponsibility.”24 These types of arguments serve as the 
basis that behavior is negatively changed through the transfer of risk from one party to 
another. 
As summarized by Baker, the conventional argument has been that “moral hazard 
signifies the perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share the burdens of 
life, and it also helps deny that refusing to share those burdens is mean-spirited or self-
interested.”25 Baker continues with, “the real lesson of moral hazard should be that the 
world is a relational web and cannot be reduced to truisms.”26 Given that researchers 
have liberally applied the concept of moral hazard to federal government involvement in 
disaster recovery, is the application of the concept of moral hazard justified?27  
2. Origins of Moral Hazard 
The origins of moral hazard can be traced back to the Victorian era dice game of 
“hazard,” which has evolved into the modern game of craps.28 As described by Baker, 
hazard was a popular game of chance in both England and the United States.29 The 
calculation of the odds of hazard resulted in Pascal’s theory of probability, which served 
as the basis for the early insurance enterprise.30 In the early nineteenth-century, scientists 
expanded on the doctrine of chance and hypothesized that observation of the past could 
predict the future for both moral and physical phenomena.31 
                                                 
24 David S. Broder, “Armey’s Axioms,” The Washington Post, June 21, 1995, sec. op/ed; Baker, “On 
the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 240.  
25 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 239.  
26 Ibid., 240.  
27 Carolyn Kousky and Leonard Shabman, “The Hazard of the Moral Hazard—Or Not,” Natural 
Hazards Observer XXXVII, no. 5 (2013): 12.   
28 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 244–245.  
29 Herbert Asbury, Sucker’s Progress: An Informal History of Gambling in America (New York: 
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938), 45; Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 244.  
30 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 246–247.  
31 John A. Fowler, History of Insurance in Philadelphia for Two Centuries (1683–1882) (Philadelphia: 
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1888), 393; Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 247.  
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The first references to moral hazard come from the nineteenth-century fire 
insurance trade, when insurers were concerned with an unwholesome mix of bad 
character and temptation that needed to be controlled.32 The term moral hazard first 
appeared in the Practice of Fire Underwriting written by Arthur C. Ducat in 1862. As the 
Late Secretary and Chief Surveyor for the Chicago Board of Underwriters, Ducat wrote, 
The remarks upon the subject of incendiarism, and the moral hazard, may 
seem, perhaps, of greater length than the subject would seem to warrant; 
but it is a subject of the greatest importance. There is no one hazard that 
insurance companies have to guard and contend against as great as this. 
No premium is adequate, in such-cases; and when the anxiety of a 
company to do business, or the thirst of an agent for his commission, is so 
great as to shut their eyes against the fact, inevitable ruin must sooner or 
later be the result.33  
As Ducat posits, an insurance policy should not be issued where morally questionable 
characteristics exist.34 
Benjamin Hale notes, “talk of moral hazard has been around since as long as the 
modern insurance industry, which dates based as far as 1662.”35 For nineteenth-century 
insurers, moral hazard was applied to both the character of people and situations.36 For 
the insurance industry, the character of an individual plays a pivotal role in determining 
the chance that coverage would be needed. Furthermore, the insurance contracts need to 
be structured to remove the temptation to use the contract.  
As defined by Rowell and Connelly, “The essential idea was that the purchase of 
insurance encouraged moral hazard which could manifest as either (1) a deliberate act of 
fraud or (2) an act of carelessness.”37 To this day, the basic understanding of moral 
                                                 
32 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 240.  
33 Arthur C. Ducat, Practice of Fire Underwriting, 4th ed. (New York: T. Jones, Jr, Insurance Monitor 
Office, 1865), 11.  
34 Ibid., 11–12.  
35 Benjamin Hale, “What’s So Moral about the Moral Hazard?,” Public Affairs Quarterly 23, no. 1 
(2009): 3.  
36 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 250.  
37 Rowell and Connelly, “A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard,’” 1061.  
 8
hazard remains virtually unchanged in the insurance industry,38 and morality remains a 
fundamental element in the process to determine insurability. The efforts to remove 
immorality from the insurance trade have played a key role in the transformation of the 
industry into the mass consumer enterprise that it is today.39 
Economists argue that market forces seek an optimized equilibrium and play a 
fundamental role in defining what is acceptable and not acceptable. For instance, 
economist Kenneth Arrow explains, “when the market fails to achieve an optimal state, 
society will, to some extent at least, recognize the gap, and nonmarket social institutions 
will arise attempting to bridge it.”40 He continues with, “The welfare case for insurance 
policies of all sorts is overwhelming. It follows that the government should undertake 
insurance in those cases where this market, for whatever reason, has failed to emerge.”41 
Basically, Arrow argues that government may need to act when markets are unwilling, 
regardless of the potential moral hazard implications that are assumed. Arrow 
summarizes these arguments by stating, “the preference for redistribution expressed in 
government taxation and expenditure policies and private charity can be reinterpreted as 
desire for insurance.”42 In essence, the government should consider intervention where 
the market is unwilling to provide for the societal type of insurance. The economist’s 
viewpoint of moral hazard is more closely aligned with the work of Naomi Zack on 
disaster ethics and the emergence of a second social contract.  
3. The Relation of Moral Hazard to Disaster Recovery 
The concept of moral hazard was born out of the insurance industry as a 
component to ensure the soundness of the insurance transaction. Morality plays a key role 
in determining insurability as a protection for the insurance provider against chance. 
These concepts remain in the insurance trade, as noted in an Aetna Guide: “excluding 
                                                 
38 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 265–266.  
39 Ibid., 241.  
40 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” The American 
Economic Review LIII, no. 5 (1963): 947.  
41 Ibid., 961.  
42 Ibid., 947.  
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morally hazardous applicants and structuring the insurance contract so that no one could 
make a gain through an insured loss.”43 Moral hazard within the insurance industry is 
based on the notion that redistribution of risk changes a person’s behavior. 
Government disaster recovery programs are designed as an extension of or 
supplement to private insurance.44 So it is no surprise that the application of moral hazard 
concepts in disaster recovery aligns with the interpretations of the insurance industry. 
While many commentators have argued that current federal disaster recovery programs 
are entitlements that have created a moral hazard, Carolyn Kousky and Leonard Shabman 
do not believe the evidence of moral hazard in recovery programs for individuals and 
households is compelling.45 In an article for the Natural Hazards Observer, they argue 
that federal aid programs are not enough to cover losses from severe damage.46 However, 
they do allow that these counter indicators to moral hazard are limited to specific 
assistance programs. 
4. Federal Disaster Recovery Contributing to Moral Hazard 
“Where is my FEMA debit card?” became a humorless punchline for disaster 
relief workers in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent response to 
Hurricane Rita. As an assistance measure to displaced individuals, FEMA initiated a $2 
billion program to provide $2,000 debit cards to those evacuated from the Gulf Coast.47 
The program was rife with fraud and abuse. While FEMA acknowledged that it was a 
pilot program and did not work, Congressional members quickly pounced, referring to 
the program as a “cash cow.”48  
                                                 
43 Baker, “On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,” 260.  
44 Rawle O. King, Tsunamis and Earthquakes: Is Federal Disaster Insurance in Our Future? 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32847.pdf.  
45 Kousky and Shabman, “The Hazard of the Moral Hazard—Or Not.”  
46 Ibid.  
47 Eric Lipton, “‘Breathtaking’ Waste and Fraud in Hurricane Aid,” The New York Times, June 27, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/washington/27katrina.html, sec. Washington.  
48 Ibid.  
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Has the expansion of federal disaster recovery programs contributed to the rise of 
moral hazard (the assumption that government will take care of recovery)? General 
Russell Honoré was the U.S. Army officer tasked by President Bush to respond to the 
failures in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. As remarked by General Honoré, 
every dollar we commit to mitigation and preparedness equates to seven to nine dollars 
we will spend on response and recovery.49 
In an article for the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, James Fossett 
argues that the government needs to stop improvising disaster recovery programs. Fossett 
acknowledged that response to Hurricane Sandy showed significant improvement over 
the immediate response of Hurricane Katrina. However, the long-term recovery process, 
starting with how the federal government financed the recovery assistance, remained 
improvised and fragmented.50 The supplemental appropriation process used by the 
federal government to fund the Disaster Recovery Fund (DRF) for Hurricane Sandy 
required state and local jurisdictions to deal with multiple federal agencies separately, 
and this fragmented recovery efforts.51 Also, the supplemental appropriations requiring 
congressional approval resulted in politics, which delayed assistance. Due to the ongoing 
deficit reduction debate, supplemental appropriations for Hurricane Sandy were delayed 
by several months.52 The resulting impact was that initial flood insurance program 
payouts were underpaid. In the interim, some assistance was provided to property owners 
through other programs. As the political stalemate was resolved, FEMA reopened cases 
to give an opportunity for additional flood insurance payments for Hurricane Sandy 
                                                 
49 Corey McKenna, “Creating a Culture of Preparedness Is the Best Hope for Disaster Mitigation, Lt. 
Gen. Russel Honore Says,” Emergency Management, May 22, 2009, 
http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Creating-a-Culture-of.html; Russel L. Honore, “Leadership: 
Building a Culture of Preparedness” (presented at 56th IAEM Annual Conference & EMEX 2008, 
Overland Park, KA, November 2008), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Creating-a-Culture-
of.html.  
50 James W. Fossett, “Let’s Stop Improvising Disaster Recovery,” Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of 
Government, July 2013, http://www.rockinst.org/observations/fossettj/2013-07-09-
Improvising_Disaster_Recovery.aspx.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
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claims, but the delay had already frustrated many policyholders.53 As Scanlon has 
described, disasters present a chance to alter the public agenda with timely, dramatic 
action to mitigate the next disaster; otherwise, we are destined to return to the status 
quo.54 
Since the 1950s, the federal government’s role in providing disaster assistance has 
continued to increase, and it has supplanted charity in this domain. With this expanded 
role, government policies should be formulated to provide rapid assistance and promote 
the opportunity to mitigate against the next disaster. 
5. Federal Intervention through the NFIP 
Aspects of the NFIP provide an example of federal policy contributing to moral 
hazard and limiting the reduction of risk. The NFIP was created to provide coverage to 
those that private insurance companies would not insure due to the level of risk. The 
NFIP includes requirements for communities to meet federal standards for floodplain 
management, but enforcement of requirements is lax. In addition, repetitive losses 
account for the disproportionate percentage of NFIP claims. As characterized in the 2011 
NFIP Actuarial Rate Review, the NFIP is preferable to disaster relief as premiums fund at 
least part of disaster recovery from flood damage.55  
Following significant payouts for insurance claims to the hurricane impacts in the 
late-2000s, especially Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Sandy in 2012, the NFIP 
is on the verge of fiscal collapse. While Congress acted to shore up the NFIP’s financial 
issues through BW-12, outcry from constituents resulted in the repeal of those policies 
with the HFIAA. The implementation of these two pieces of legislation illustrates the 
dynamic political environment surrounding government involvement in disaster recovery. 
In The Dictator’s Handbook, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith describe,  
                                                 
53 Emily Dooley, “New York and New Jersey Area Leaders Urge Feds to Waive Grant-Recoup Rule 
for Superstorm Sandy Victims,” Emergency Management, August 14, 2015, 
http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Area-leaders-urge-feds-to-waive-grant-recoup-rule-for-
superstorm-Sandy-victims.html.  
54 Scanlon, “Reaching Out,” 97.  
55 Hayes and Neal, NFIP Actuarial Rate Review, 4.  
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The rules governing how people rule inevitably divorce what policies 
politicians really desire from what they say and do. Not that we doubt that 
politicians hold sincere views of good and bad public policy—rather those 
views are not terribly important and, besides, there are few ways to tell the 
difference between declarations based on opportunistic political 
expediency and true beliefs.56 
The application of moral hazard to federal involvement in disaster recovery shares 
similarities with the interpretations of moral hazard from insurance. Although disaster 
assistance was once the sole domain of charitable organizations, it has now largely 
become a function of the government. As federal involvement in disaster assistance has 
expanded, the incentives to reduce risk are minimized. As risk is transferred from the 
individual to the government, the incentive for people to engage in meaningful activities 
to mitigate or prevent risk has waned. Furthermore, the impact of moral hazard has 
contributed to increased and repetitive disaster losses with increasing recovery costs 
falling on government. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis seeks to explore how federal government’s involvement in disaster 
assistance might contribute to the rise of a moral hazard through a case study of the 
NFIP. Focus is on the NFIP to identify aspects of the program that may limit risk 
reduction behavior. NFIP data on claims and costs serve as the primary instrumentation 
to evaluate potential impacts of program policies and identify findings for application to 
the broader scope of government disaster assistance programs. 
1. Object of Study 
The NFIP serves as the subject of a case study to identify aspects of the program 
that limit risk reduction behavior and contribute to the rise of a moral hazard. Findings 
from the case study are considered against the broader spectrum of expanded federal 
government involvement in providing disaster assistance. 
                                                 
56 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), Kindle ed. 135.  
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2. Study Limitations  
A review of disaster research indicates the assumption of moral hazard related to 
federal government involvement in providing disaster assistance. For this case study, the 
theory of moral hazard and its application to limiting risk reduction behavior is 
considered valid. However, this researcher recognizes that this study may also show that 
moral hazard related to government involvement in providing assistance is a minor issue. 
While it is understood that other federal government disaster assistance programs may 
contribute to limiting risk reduction behavior and giving rise to moral hazard, the case 
study confines itself to an exploration of the NFIP. 
3. Instrumentation (Data and Evidence)  
The study reviews the origins of moral hazard and the application of the theory of 
moral hazard to government involvement in disaster assistance to provide a baseline. The 
NFIP serves as the case study of how government assistance can limit risk reduction 
behavior. Moreover, NFIP issues related to repetitive loss, program subsidies, and 
significant loss events are used as instrumentation to demonstrate how government 
assistance contributes to limiting risk reduction and giving rise to a moral hazard. Finally, 
data from the NFIP on claims, costs, and significant loss events provide evidence of 
programmatic elements impacting risk reduction behavior. 
4. Steps of Analysis 
As defined by Robert Yin in Case Study Research: Design and Methods, the case 
study is structured around five components: the study’s question, its propositions, its 
units of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings.57 This case study is a qualitative exploratory theory-building 
analysis of how the NFIP has contributed to limiting risk reduction behavior and given 
rise to a moral hazard. Claim and cost data from the NFIP serves as the unit of analysis to 
link expanded involvement by the federal government in disaster assistance to the rise of 
moral hazard. 
                                                 
57 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed., Applied Social Research 
Methods Series, vol. 5 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014), 27.  
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While disaster research has largely accepted the theory of moral hazard related to 
government involvement in disaster assistance, it is recognized that the theory may not 
apply to the case study. The study looks for other contributing factors that are related to 
failures to provide long-term mitigation of flood hazards to determine what role the NFIP 
may or may not play in the rise of moral hazard. 
5. Intended Output 
The study seeks to provide a deeper understanding of how expanded federal 
involvement in disaster assistance contributes to the increase of moral hazard through a 
case study of the NFIP. From this case study, generalizations can be drawn to other 
government disaster assistance programs. This provides a better understanding of how 
federal intervention in disaster assistance can create the unintended consequence of moral 
hazard. 
E. THESIS CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I introduces the research questions to look at how federal involvement in 
providing disaster assistance limits risk reduction behavior, and it examines the NFIP as 
an exemplary example to study. Additionally, the chapter provides the problem 
statement, literature review, and research design as an introduction to the thesis. 
Chapter II explores the evolution of federal involvement in providing flood 
assistance. This chapter includes a summary of the current NFIP related to the three 
primary program elements of flood hazard identification and risk assessment, floodplain 
management, and flood insurance. The chapter also includes a summary of significant 
legislative adjustments that have been implemented to address shortcomings in the NFIP. 
Chapter III focuses on addressing the question of does the NFIP limit risk 
reduction? This chapter explores the NFIP through the issues of repetitive loss properties, 
the continued use of flood insurance subsidies, and significant flood events as 
contributing factors to the program limiting risk reduction. 
The final chapter, Chapter IV, summarizes the findings associated with the study 
of the NFIP and seeks to apply them to the research questions. Also, the chapter aims to 
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apply the concepts presented against the broader spectrum of expanded federal 
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II. A STUDY OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN FLOOD 
ASSISTANCE 
Drabek defines disaster as,  
Accidental or uncontrollable events, actual or threatened, that are 
“concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-
sufficient subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such 
losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure 
is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of 
society is prevented.”58 
Emergency management has long had a focus on natural hazards as the primary 
large-scale threat to populations across the globe. At the core of this threat is the hazard 
of flooding. Whether the impact to a community comes from flash flooding caused by a 
severe thunderstorm, storm surge from a tropical storm system, or riverine flooding from 
heavy rains, the destructive power of hydrological hazards has challenged community 
planners and emergency management doctrine since its inception. 
A review of disaster declaration data from FEMA supports these assertions. From 
1953 to 2015, natural hazards account for 99.6 percent of all major disaster 
declarations.59 Furthermore, the data shows that flooding or flood-related impacts account 
for 78.2 percent of all major disaster declarations for the same period (see Figure 1).60 An 
article by Melanie Gall et al. studied the trends of natural hazard losses in the United 
States and shows that “since the 1960s, nearly 85 percent of direct economic losses can 
be attributed to severe atmospheric and hydrological events.”61  
                                                 
58 Charles E. Fritz’s 1961 Contemporary Social Problems, quoted in Thomas E. Drabek, Human 
System Response to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings (New York: Springer-Verlag New 
York Inc., 1986), 7.  
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations,” accessed July 14, 2016, 
https://www.fema.gov/disasters. See Appendix A, in which major disaster declaration data from 1953 to 
2015 is reviewed. Data is limited to major disaster declarations and excludes emergency declarations and 
fire management assistance grants.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Melanie Gall et al., “The Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States,” 
Sustainability 3 (2011): 2164, doi:10.3390/su3112157.   
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Figure 1.  Major Disaster Declarations, 1953–201562 
                                                 
62 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations.” See Appendix A. Data is limited to major disaster declarations and excludes 


























































































































































































































































The threat of natural hazards is not limited to the United States. In a journal 
article, David Strömberg notes, “between 1980 and 2004, two million people were killed 
and five billion people cumulatively affected by around 7,000 natural disasters… the 
direct economic damage from natural disasters between 1980 and 2004 is estimated at 
around $1 trillion.”63 Data also supports a trend of natural disasters, and specifically 
flooding, having a greater impact on populations—fueled by expanded development into 
areas at risk and the enhanced threat of flooding from climate change. 
The data clearly demonstrates the prominence of weather-related hazards as the 
primary source of major disasters in the United States. In response to the impacts of 
natural hazards, federal government involvement in assisting with the impacts of major 
disasters has also continued to evolve and expand. Before the 1950s, federal government 
involvement in disasters was largely limited to expressions of sympathy that sometimes 
included token financial assistance.64 The task of response and recovery from disasters 
was left to local communities with states, churches, and volunteers providing support. 
The origins of expanded federal involvement in providing disaster assistance can be 
traced to massive flooding along the lower Mississippi River valley in 1927 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN FLOODING 
For much of our country’s history, implementation of measures to control flood 
waters was the responsibility of individual landowners and state and local governments.65 
The federal government limited its early involvement to clearing obstructions and 
improving navigation through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.66 However, the role of 
the federal government was forever changed with major flooding along the lower 
Mississippi River Valley in the 1920s and 1930s.  
                                                 
63 David Strömberg, “Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 199, doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.199.   
64 Platt, Disasters and Democracy, 137. 
65 Greg O’Brien, “Making the Mississippi River over Again: The Development of River Control in 
Mississippi,” Mississippi History Now, March 2002, 
http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/94/making-the-mississippi-river-over-again.  
66 Ibid.  
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Almost as soon as European settlers arrived in the lower Mississippi River Valley, 
they built levees in an attempt to prevent flooding. Levee construction was not a 
government-driven effort; rather, it was left to individual landowners along the river 
valley. The approach lacked comprehensive planning and standards of engineering and 
construction that resulted in a patchy and inadequate levee system from the upper 
midwest downstream to New Orleans.67 By the late 1850s, settlers in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Arkansas had constructed 2,000 miles of levees on both shores of the 
river to protect the lower Mississippi River Valley.68 The flood of 1858–1859 showed 
these efforts to be inadequate as many levees failed, causing extensive flooding in the 
region.69 Following the Civil War, levee construction became the responsibility of local 
boards with taxing authority to raise funds for flood control projects. However, this 
funding proved to be inadequate as floods continued to destroy river-control efforts, and 
there were major overflows in 1874, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1890, 1897, 1903, 1912, and 
1913.70 With insufficient flood control funding and the need to understand the river’s 
hydraulics, landowners began to turn to the federal government for assistance.71 
In the winter of 1927, persistent heavy rains along the tributaries of the 
Mississippi caused flooding in Oklahoma, Kansas, Illinois, and Kentucky.72 By mid-
April, the initial flooding of the tributaries combined with record rain across Missouri, 
Illinois, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana. It created what Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover called “the greatest disaster of peace times in our history” as 
flooding had dramatic impacts across the entirety of the lower Mississippi River Valley.73 
The flood overwhelmed the levee system throughout the lower Mississippi River Valley, 
                                                 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 O’Brien, “Making the Mississippi River;” National Weather Service, “Mississippi River Flood 
History 1543–Present,” October 12, 2011, http://www.weather.gov/lix/ms_flood_history.  
71 O’Brien, “Making the Mississippi River.”  
72 National Weather Service, “Mississippi River Flood History;” Stephen Ambrose, “Man vs. Nature: 
The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927,” Expedition Journal, May 1, 2001, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/05/0501_river4.html.   
73 Ambrose, “Man vs. Nature;” O’Brien, “Making the Mississippi River.”  
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flooding 23,000 square miles, forcing 700,000 people from their homes, and destroying 
an estimated $400 million worth of property.74 The influence of a disaster to affect 
politics is highlighted when President Coolidge chose to do nothing to assist states and 
communities impacted by the massive flooding.75 Then Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover chaired a special committee to handle the disaster and used the position to garner 
the publicity that led to his nomination as the 1928 Republican nominee for the 
presidency.76 
Major riverine floods resulted in the passage of several flood control acts that 
expand federal involvement in structural flood-control projects, such as the construction 
of dams and levees, to protect life and property.77 Even so, disaster assistance to flood 
victims remained limited. Despite billions of dollars in federal investments for structural 
flood-control projects, the impacts on lives and property losses from floods continued to 
increase. 
Historically, the catastrophic nature of flooding limits the ability to develop a rate 
structure that adequately reflects the full-risk to flood-prone properties.78 Based on this 
issue, by the 1950s a private insurance market that could profitably provide flood 
insurance at an affordable price did not emerge. As highlighted in Disasters and 
Democracy,  
Flood zoning, like almost all that is virtuous, has great verbal support, but 
almost nothing has been done about it. A few local governments have 
restricted the use of low-lying lands, but not enough for us to point to any 
substantial amount of experience or any great degree of progress.79  
                                                 
74 O’Brien, “Making the Mississippi River.”  
75 Ambrose, “Man vs. Nature.”  
76 Ibid.  
77 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program [NFIP]: Program 
Description (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Insurance and Mitigation 
Administration, 2002), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1447-20490-
2156/nfipdescrip_1_.pdf, 1.  
78 Congressional Budget Office, The National Flood Insurance Program: Factors Affecting Actuarial 
Soundness (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2009), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10620/11-04-floodinsurance.pdf, 13.  
79 Platt, Disasters and Democracy, 210–212.  
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These issues led to the development of initial proposals for the federal government to 
provide flood insurance. While not implemented by Congress at the time, it did introduce 
the concept of federal government support of a flood insurance program. 
In 1965, Hurricane Betsy devastated the southeastern United States; this resulted 
in Congress passing the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act. The legislation began to 
redefine federal policies and approaches to flood control, including providing direct 
financial assistance to flood victims and authorizing a feasibility study of a national flood 
insurance program.80 Based on the information from the feasibility study, a task force 
was formed to advocate for flood control within the context of floodplain development 
based on the following five major goals: 
 Improve basic knowledge about flood hazards; 
 Coordinate and plan new development in the floodplain; 
 Provide technical services; 
 Move toward a practical national program of flood insurance; and 
 Adjust federal flood control policy to sound criteria and changing needs.81 
The combination of the feasibility study and task force report provided the basis 
for the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. Expanding on the previously established 
goals of the task force, the legislation established the NFIP with the purpose of:  
 Better indemnify individuals for flood losses through insurance; 
 Reduce future flood damages through State and community floodplain 
management regulations; and 
 Reduce Federal expenditures for disaster assistance and flood control.82 
                                                 
80 Federal Emergency Management Agency, NFIP: Program Description, 1.  
81 Gilbert F. White et al., A Unified National Program for Managing Flood Losses: A Report by the 
Task Force on Federal Flood Control Policy (Washington DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 1966), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/find/hearings/floods/floods89-465.pdf, iv.   
82 Office of the General Council, All-Hazard Authorities of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency: The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as Amended, and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 
1973, as Amended; 42 U.S.C. 4001 et Seq. (Washington, DC: FEMA Office of the General Council, 1997), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1545-20490-9247/frm_acts.pdf, 1–2.  
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B. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
The NFIP is designed as a mitigation program with the underlying goal of 
reducing future loss of life and property from flooding. In Rawle King’s view, “Congress 
established the NFIP to address the nation’s flood exposure and challenges inherent in 
financing and managing flood risks in the private sector.”83 The NFIP consists of three 
main elements: 
 Flood hazard identification and risk assessment: Creation of flood 
insurance rate maps to identify areas across the nation at risk of flooding; 
 Floodplain management: Coordination with local communities to 
minimize the impact of flooding through floodplain management 
ordinances based on federally defined minimum standards; and 
 Flood insurance: Creation of a federally subsidized insurance program that 
protects homes and businesses by providing a mechanism to pre-fund the 
risk from flood losses.84 
As stated by FEMA, “overall, the program reduces the socio-economic impact of 
disasters by promoting the purchase and retention of general risk insurance, but also of 
flood insurance, specifically.”85 While subsidized by the federal government, the 
program relies on partnerships with private insurance and servicing contractors. The 
program also encompasses public policy and relies on the cooperation with local 
communities to adopt and enforce standards. The following sections outline the NFIP 
components and highlight the legislative initiatives implemented to address shortcomings 
in the program. 
1. Flood Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
The NFIP establishes policies for the federal government to identify flood-prone 
areas and map zones at risk for flooding. The common tool for communicating risk to a 
                                                 
83 Rawle O. King, National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges, and Financial Status 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40650.pdf, 
Summary.  
84 Patricia Griggs, “The National Flood Insurance Program,” YouTube video, posted by Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, October 26, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGYIblbHJQM.  
85 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “The National Flood Insurance Program.”  
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community and its residents is the FIRM,86 which identifies areas at risk of flooding (see 
Figure 2 for an example of a FIRM). On a FIRM, areas at risk for flooding are identified 
as special flood hazard areas (SFHA) that assist in the determination of requirements for 
flood insurance and establish a flood insurance rate. FIRMs also assist local officials with 
identifying locations within the community where floodplain management regulations are 
required to be implemented. 
 
Figure 2.  Flood Insurance Rate Map from Harris County, Texas87 
                                                 
86 FIRMs are also referred to as flood maps. 
87 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, “NFIP FIRM Harris County, Texas and 
Incorporated Areas: Panel 290 of 1150—Map 48201C0290N,” 2014, 
http://map1.msc.fema.gov/idms/IntraView.cgi?KEY=12116785&IFIT=1.  
 25
An initial challenge to the NFIP was the need to develop flood insurance rate 
maps for all communities participating in the program. During the early implementation 
of the NFIP, while FIRMs were being drafted for communities at risk, an emergency 
program was established that used less detailed maps based on local information that 
estimated the risk.88 The emergency program was conceived as a temporary measure to 
increase participation in the NFIP. However, constant delays kept the program in place 
through the early 1980s.89 The delays in the establishment of FIRMs resulted in 
continued development in at-risk locations. Development that occurred during this 
timeframe was termed pre-FIRM and was grandfathered into the NFIP with eligibility for 
subsidized insurance rates not reflective of the level of risk. Properties that were 
grandfathered into the NFIP have expected losses five times that of properties developed 
by FIRM criteria.90 Losses related to pre-FIRM development continue to plague the NFIP 
and highlight the importance of establishing sound hazard identification and risk 
assessment information before implementation of floodplain management and flood 
insurance programs. 
The federal government implementation of flood hazard identification and risk 
assessment is a multi-billion-dollar program that is administered by FEMA. Over 22,000 
communities participate in the NFIP with ongoing efforts to modernize and update flood 
maps.91 These efforts are currently focused on digitizing map products to improve 
accessibility to the public. The mapping of flood risk is a dynamic process that must 
                                                                                                                                                 
The selected FIRM is Panel 290 of 1150 for Harris County, Texas (chosen for the areas extensive 
history of flooding and it includes the author’s childhood home). The FIRM depicts the floodway, 100-year 
flood zone (zone AE), and 500-year flood zone (zone X) for Cypress Creek located in northern Harris 
County. Note that some development is located in the floodway, 100-year flood zone, and 500-year flood 
zone. 
88 Adelle Thomas and Robin Leichenko, “Adaptation through Insurance: Lessons from the NFIP,” 
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 3, no. 3 (2011): 257, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17568691111153401.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Dwight M. Jaffee, “Commentary: Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 88, no. 4 (2006): 383.  
91 Carolyn Kousky and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “Examining Flood Insurance Claims in the United 
States: Six Key Findings,” The Journal of Risk and Insurance (2015), doi:10.1111/jori.12106, 3.  
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continually be updated as communities’ experience population growth and development, 
methodologies of evaluation are improved, and changes in climate affect flood risk. 
The process to issue or update a FIRM starts with a flood insurance survey (FIS). 
FEMA defines an FIS as “a compilation and presentation of flood risk data for specific 
watercourses, lakes, and coastal flood hazard areas within a community.”92 The FIS 
report contains detailed information on identified floodways and the base flood elevation 
based on a detailed hydrologic analysis. The base flood is defined as a flood that has a 
one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year, sometimes referred 
to as the 100-year flood standard.93 The base flood elevation is the primary mechanism to 
define the SFHA for at-risk zones within a community. Within the SFHA, properties 
purchased with federally backed or regulated lenders are required to purchase flood 
insurance through the NFIP.94 Also, participating communities in the NFIP are mandated 
to implement federally defined floodplain management standards in SFHA.  
At-risk zones identified on FIRMs are based on the type of flood hazard and 
methodology used to establish the level of flood hazard. Within the SFHA, two types of 
high-hazard zones are identified, “A” and “V” zones. A zones are subject to inundation 
from the one percent base flood event. V zones are subject to wave action or storm surge, 
typically along coastal areas. Flood insurance prices vary by zone and the structural 
characteristics of the building, most notably the relative height of the lowest floor above 
the base flood elevation.95 The NFIP groups similar risks in flood zones and assigns 
properties located in the zone the same flood insurance rate.96 FIRMs also identify 
                                                 
92 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Flood Insurance Study,” accessed April 27, 2016, 
http://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance-study.  
93 National Academies Keck Center, Reducing Flood Losses: Is the 1% Chance (100-Year) Flood 
Standard Sufficient (Washington DC: National Academies Keck Center, 2004), 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/16/nrcs143_009401.pdf, 5. The Department of 
Housing and Urban Development attempted to begin phasing out the “100-year flood” terminology in 
1975, although it remains a common term related to flooding. 
94 Carolyn Kousky and Leonard Shabman, Pricing Flood Insurance: How and Why the NFIP Differs 
from a Private Insurance Company (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 2014), 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-37.pdf, 3. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid.  
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moderate and low-risk zones. “B” or moderate risk zones are subject to inundation from 
the 0.2 percent base flood event (sometimes referred to as the 500-year flood zone). “C” 
or low-risk zones are areas where flood insurance is encouraged, but there are no 
requirements for it. Also, the NFIP uses an “X” designator for moderate to low risk areas 
where the flood hazard is undetermined. Appendix B lists each of the zones and 
methodology used to define the zone under the NFIP. 
The flood hazard identification and risk assessment capability developed as part 
of the NFIP serves as a critical component to communicate flood risk to communities and 
establish flood insurance rates for participants. Ongoing efforts on the part of FEMA 
continue to update and modernize the flood-risk information to make it more accessible 
to the public and improve the accuracy of FIRMs. Information developed out of the flood 
hazard identification and risk assessment process serves as the basis for identifying 
locations within a community that are subject to the requirements of the NFIP related 
floodplain management and flood insurance. Both of these elements will be explored in 
the following sections. 
2. Floodplain Management 
One of the goals of the NFIP is to reduce the losses and damages caused by 
flooding. The primary method used to accomplish this goal is the establishment of 
floodplain management standards designed to mitigate the flood hazard. Floodplain 
management standards apply the base flood elevation as the minimum elevation that the 
lowest level must be set at or above for all new or substantially improved development.97 
The intent of this standard is not to prohibit development, but rather to ensure that 
development is constructed in such a way as to be protected from a base flood event. 
Also, floodplain management standards require that management of new developments 
not to increase the flood hazard within an area. 
                                                 
97 Federal Emergency Management Agency, NFIP: Program Description, 13.  
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For a community to participate in the NFIP, it must adopt floodplain management 
ordinances adhering to the minimum standards established at the federal level.98 The 
ordinances must apply to all development that might take place in identified SFHA 
depicted on a FIRM. Development is not merely the construction or modification of 
buildings but includes the construction of bridges, roads, levees, water treatment 
facilities, and modifications to land.99 Any development in an SFHA must be permitted 
by the local community, with elevation certifications issued by a licensed surveyor or 
engineer, thus ensuring that development will not be damaged by a base flood event or 
increase the flood risk in the area. 
As identified, pre-FIRM development is a substantial challenge to the NFIP due 
to the grandfathered status of property developed before the establishment of the base 
flood elevation. While pre-FIRM development remains a challenge, the NFIP seeks to 
address pre-FIRM issues through requirements for those properties to come into 
compliance with floodplain management regulations anytime a pre-FIRM development 
undergoes substantial improvement or suffers substantial damage. Substantial 
improvement or substantial damage is based on changes or repairs made to a structure 
that results in the improvement or repair cost exceeding 50 percent of the market value of 
the development.100 While there are exemptions and variances can be requested, the 
general rule is that the structure must come into compliance with floodplain management 
requirements. These compliance requirements represent an ongoing effort of the NFIP to 
address early implementation issues. 
The base flood elevation is established based on the 100-year flood standard (i.e., 
a one percent chance of a flood event for any given year). Since the program’s inception, 
                                                 
98 “Local Floodplain Development Regulations,” YouTube video, posted by Gary Taylor, October 15, 
2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4EJ4qrrkK0&list=PLADFiMUo5Nk7ajNQxa8N5 
s9G1IJ4gRrsZ&index=1.  
99 “Overview of Regulatory Requirements: What Is Development? When Is a Permit Required?,” 
YouTube video, posted by Gary Taylor, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S7aI2QRWspA&list=PLADFiMUo5Nk7ajNQxa8N5s9G1IJ4gRrsZ&i
ndex=2.  
100 “Substantial Damages and Substantial Improvements,” YouTube video, posted by Gary Taylor, 
October 15, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wt3lMwCRhd0&list=PLADFiMUo5Nk7 
ajNQxa8N5s9G1IJ4gRrsZ&index=3.  
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the NFIP has used the 100-year standard as a reasonable level of protection without 
imposing overly stringent requirements or create excessive costs for property owners.101 
Over the course of the NFIP, critics have questioned if the 100-year standard remained 
appropriate in light of continued losses due to flooding. Both in 1976 and 1983, the 
federal government commissioned studies of the 100-year standard to determine its 
continued appropriateness as the minimum standard within the NFIP.102 The studies’ 
findings led to the continued use of the 100-year standard.103  
Regardless, questions remain over whether the 100-year base flood elevation 
standard is sufficient to mitigate the impact of flooding. On January 30, 2015, President 
Barack Obama issued an amendment to executive order 11988 originally published in 
1977 (floodplain management), to establish a more conservative flood-risk reduction 
standard for federally funded projects as part of The President’s Climate Action Plan.104 
The revised standard provides three methodologies for establishing a modified flood risk 
elevation: 
 Use data and methods informed by best available, actionable climate 
science; 
 Build two feet above the 100-year flood elevation for standard projects, 
and three feet above for critical buildings like hospitals and evacuation 
centers; or 
 Build to the 500-year (0.2 percent annual chance) flood elevation.105 
While the revised standards apply to federally funded projects, the original NFIP 
100-year base flood elevation standard and associated subsidized insurance rates remain 
in place for the vast majority of the program.106 Communities do have the option to adopt 
                                                 
101 National Academies Keck Center, Reducing Flood Losses, 113.  
102 Ibid., 5–6.  
103 Ibid.  
104 White House, “Executive Order—Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a 
Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input,” January 30, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/executive-order-establishing-federal-flood-risk-
management-standard-and-.  
105 Ibid.  
106 White House, “Fact Sheet: Taking Action to Protect Communities and Reduce the Cost of Future 
Flood Disasters,” January 30, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/node/320041.  
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stricter flood elevation standards as part of their floodplain management program; this is 
referred to as freeboard.107 At the time of the issuance of the executive order in 2015, the 
White House indicated that at least 350 communities across the country had already met 
or exceeded the revised standards outlined in the executive order.108 However, when 
considered in the context of the participation of over 22,000 communities in the program, 
the figure represents only a small percentage of communities opting for stricter flood 
elevation standards. 
While floodplain management serves as the primary method to mitigate the 
impacts of flooding, data to support the effectiveness of the program is limited. FEMA 
operates a process to assess a community’s floodplain management ordinance and 
enforcement actions through community assistance visits (CAV) and community 
assistance contacts (CAC).109 However, given resource limitations, FEMA must use 
criteria to prioritize communities that are assessed based on known or suspected 
deficiencies.110 When violations or compliance issues are identified, communities receive 
an opportunity to implement corrective actions. A community may be placed on 
probation or suspension from the NFIP for failure to address violations or program 
deficiencies. While the CAV/CAC program serves to ensure compliance with the NFIP, 
results of CAV/CAC findings are not readily available. 
Furthermore, Ed Pasterick who served with FEMA for 41 years working in NFIP 
noted in 1988, “There has never been a comprehensive assessment of the level of 
compliance nationwide.”111 In 2006, FEMA commissioned a series of evaluations of the 
NFIP that included an assessment of community compliance with NFIP floodplain 
management requirements. Researchers findings in the report, “extrapolated that between 
70 and 85 percent of NFIP communities nationwide are probably fully compliant or can 
                                                 
107 Freeboard is an additional elevation requirement above the 100-year base flood elevation standard 
that provides for a margin of safety against extraordinary or unknown risks.  
108 White House, “Fact Sheet.”  
109 Federal Emergency Management Agency, NFIP: Program Description, 17–18.  
110 Ibid., 18.  
111 Edward T. Pasterick, “The National Flood Insurance Program,” in Paying the Price: The Status 
and Role of Insurance against Natural Disasters in the United States, ed. Howard Kunreuther and Richard 
J. Roth, Sr. (Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1998), 125–154.  
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be expected to remedy identified noncompliance within two years.”112 While researchers 
worked to provide a methodology for their findings, the report admitted uncertainty in 
what the estimation of compliance indicates.113 The lack of readily available data creates 
a deficiency to identify trends and issues that may be common to compliance with the 
floodplain management requirements of the NFIP. 
3. Community Rating System 
The Community Rating System (CRS) is a program that was implemented in 
1990 as an enhancement to the floodplain management component of the NFIP. The CRS 
is a voluntary incentive-based program that recognizes communities for implementing 
proactive floodplain management activities exceeding the NFIP’s minimum floodplain 
management standards.114 Under the program, FEMA awards points for activities that are 
used to establish a community’s CRS “class” from class 10 (lowest rating) to class 1 
(highest rating). There are 19 CRS activities divided among four categories: public 
information (seven activities), mapping and regulations (five activities), flood damage 
reduction (four activities), and flood warning and response (three activities). CRS 
activities are designed to: 
 Increase awareness of flood risk; 
 Increase awareness of opportunities to protect life and property; 
 Enhance public safety; 
 Reduce damage to public property and infrastructure; and 
 Reduce economic disruption and loss.115 
Communities participating in the CRS program can receive discounts from five to 45 
percent on standard flood insurance policies. 
                                                 
112 Jacquelyn L. Monday et al., An Evaluation of Compliance with the National Flood Insurance 
Program Part A: Achieving Community Compliance (Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research, 
2006), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1602-20490-
1461/nfip_eval_community_compliance_a.pdf, 32.  
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While the CRS program is recognized as a strong enhancement to the NFIP, 
FEMA continues to look for enhancements for the CRS program as a core objective of 
the program’s strategic plan.116 The strategic plan outlined five objectives and numerous 
strategies for the sustainment and continuous improvement of the CRS.117 As of May 
2016, FEMA indicated that only five percent of the over 22,000 NFIP communities were 
participating in the CRS. While seemingly a low percentage of participation, these 
communities represent more than 69 percent of all flood insurance policies with an 
average standard flood insurance policy discount of 11.4 percent.118 
4. Flood Insurance 
Private insurance has long steered away from the developing a flood insurance 
market because of the difficulties associated with accurately assessing the highly variable 
risk of flood hazards. The lack of private insurance options serves as the basis for the 
development of the flood insurance component of the NFIP. As provided in section 1304 
of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, the NFIP “will enable interested persons to 
purchase insurance against loss resulting from physical damage to or loss of real property 
or personal property related thereto arising from any flood.”119 NFIP flood insurance 
provides the mechanism to compensate policyholders for flood damages and lessens the 
impact on taxpayers, who would otherwise be called upon to assist through federal 
disaster assistance programs.120 
                                                 
116 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program, Community Rating 
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NFIP flood insurance is based on a public/private partnership between FEMA and 
private insurance providers. While FEMA administers the program, the sale and service 
of flood insurance is facilitated by private insurance providers.121 NFIP flood insurance is 
available for business and residential structural and content protection.122 Approximately 
85 percent of NFIP flood insurance policies are sold to property owners in participating 
NFIP communities through a program known as “Write Your Own” (WYO).123 
Currently, 73 private insurance providers write the WYO policies and process claims in 
exchange for a fee from the NFIP.124 The remainder of NFIP flood insurance policies is 
purchased through a FEMA contractor.125 
The NFIP includes several varieties of policy options. For example, the Standard 
Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) specifies the terms and conditions of the agreement 
between FEMA and the WYO provider.126 SFIP provides flood insurance coverage for 
partial or complete inundation from inland and tidal waters, accumulation of surface 
waters from any source, or impacts from mudflows.127 The SFIP is mandatory for all 
properties located in the SFHA that are purchased through a mortgage from a federally 
backed or regulated lender.128 Also, some lenders require the purchase of flood insurance 
for properties located outside of the SFHA to manage risk. Properties located outside of 
the SFHA in moderate to low hazard zones (zones B, C, and X) are eligible for lower-
cost preferred risk policies (PRP).129 The NFIP also provides increased cost of 
compliance (ICC) coverage for properties that may be required to implement structural 
improvement measures to come into compliance with local floodplain management 
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requirements.130 NFIP flood insurance does not provide coverage for land, property, and 
belongings outside of the main building or most self-propelled vehicles, and it does not 
cover finished basements, buildings entirely over water, or buildings principally 
underground.131 Table 1 outlines the insurance coverage limits set by the NFIP for 
structures and contents. 







NFIP flood insurance revenue is maintained in an authorized account called the 
National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF).133 The NFIF is funded through three methods: 
 Flood insurance policy premiums, fees, and surcharges (as of December 
31, 2015, the NFIP has approximately 5.2 million policies in force with 
$3.45 billion in annual earned premiums);134 
 Direct annual appropriations for specific components of the NFIP; and  
 Borrowing from the U.S. Treasury when the NFIF is insufficient to pay 
flood insurance claims.135 
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Up until the mid-2000s, The NFIP has generally been able to cover its costs, 
needing to borrow only limited amounts from the U.S. Treasury and repaying the loans 
with interest.136 However, Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne in 2004, 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and Hurricane Sandy in 
2012 all resulted in massive flood insurance claims that bankrupted the program and 
required over $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury.137 The majority of the hurricane debt 
will likely never be repaid by the NFIP. 
The majority of NFIP flood insurance policies are based on full-risk rates 
established through FEMA’s annual NFIP actuarial rate review (an estimated 80 percent 
of policies).138 FEMA’s annual evaluation of insurance rates is based on hydrological 
modeling resulting from using a tool developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.139 
However, approximately half of properties charged full-risk rates are located outside of 
SFHAs about which not enough data is available to use modeling.140 
It should be noted that FEMA had regularly published the annual NFIP actuarial 
rate review every year through 2011; however, no rate review has been posted since the 
October 1, 2011 rate review and there is no identifiable explanation. Also, a review of the 
annual NFIP actuarial rate review shows that the NFIP claims expenditures associated the 
impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 have been excluded from calculations.141 
It is recognized by the researcher that this methodology of rate calculation provides 
balance to the actuarial rate setting process wherein an extreme event would skew the 
determinations. However, the discontinuation of publishing the annual NFIP actuarial 
rate review coincides with the additional impact of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. In light of 
the string of extreme hurricane-related flooding impacts to the NFIP, perhaps the 
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extraordinary implications of the hurricane seasons in 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2012 
demonstrate the limitations of the FEMA actuarial rate setting process. 
While the majority of NFIP flood insurance policies are based on full-risk rates, 
approximately 20 percent of policies are based on pre-FIRM subsidized rates.142 Pre-
FIRM properties were built in the SFHA before FEMA published the FIRM (generally, 
FIRMs were published between 1974 and 1983).143 Pre-FIRM properties are considered 
“grandfathered” policies, which allows for a subsidized premium to continue for a 
property, even if a new FIRM indicates a higher level of flood risk.144 The pre-FIRM 
program was created to encourage participation and designed to not unfairly penalize 
homeowners with high rates who built before the program was established.145 On 
average, the pre-FIRM subsidized policies pay between 40 to 45 percent of the full-risk 
premium needed to fund the long-term expectation of loss.146 The NFIP does not include 
provisions for FEMA to recoup the lost revenue from claims associated with pre-FIRM 
properties.147 While progress has been made to reduce the number of pre-FIRM 
properties through requirements placed on properties that undergo substantial 
improvement or substantial damage and phasing out of discounts for second homes, 
business, and repetitive loss properties, pre-FIRM policies continue to account for a 
significant percentage of NFIP losses.148 
A considerable item of concern within the flood insurance component of the NFIP 
is coverage of repetitive loss properties. FEMA defines repetitive loss and a subgroup 
referred to as severe repetitive loss as follows: 
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 Repetitive loss: “Insured properties with two or more flood losses greater 
than $1,000 within any 10-year period.”149 
 Severe repetitive loss: “Insured properties that have incurred four or more 
flood-related losses of at least $5,000 each, or at least two separate claims 
with the cumulative amount of the building payments exceeding the value 
of the structures on the property.”150 
The NFIP is structured to prevent FEMA from refusing coverage to any policyholder in a 
participating community and cannot directly compel property owners to mitigate losses 
or arbitrarily impose actuarial rates on repetitive loss properties.151 
An analysis of data provided by FEMA related to repetitive losses indicates that 
approximately 3.8 percent of NFIP policies have experienced a repetitive loss claim with 
an average of 2.98 claims per repetitive loss property.152 Table 2 highlights the 
disproportionate share of claims and costs associated with repetitive loss properties 
versus the NFIP as a whole. In addition, there is a clear connection between repetitive 
losses and establishment of FIRM. FEMA has estimated that 90 percent of all repetitive 
loss properties were constructed before the publishing of a FIRM for those locations, 
highlighting the unintended consequences of not phasing out the grandfathered status of 
pre-FIRM properties.153  
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The significance of repetitive loss properties to the NFIP goes beyond the 
substantial cost to the program. As noted by the American Association of Actuaries in a 
July 2011 report, a major concern is, “the question of whether the NFIP should continue 
to insure properties that are likely to have further losses and whether these properties are 
being subsidized by the rest of the NFIP insureds.”156  
FEMA has started several initiatives to address the repetitive loss issues. Initial 
efforts were focused on inventorying repetitive loss properties to pursue actions to 
mitigate future losses through reconstruction, elevation, or flood proofing.157 More recent 
actions have included efforts to phase out premium subsidies through grant-based 
voluntary buyouts or imposition of full actuarially based rates for property owners who 
refused to accept mitigation of flood hazards.158 As the NFIP approaches its fiftieth 
anniversary, it is clear that the impacts of early implementation continue to plague the 
long-term viability of the program. 
5. Mitigation Programs as an Extension of the NFIP 
During President Clinton’s administration, FEMA Director James Lee Witt 
worked to transform the agency based on a foundation of mitigation and prevention of 
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hazards.159 Congress tasked the agency to do a cost-benefit analysis of mitigation 
programs implemented in response to the Great Flood of 1993 that affected the majority 
of the midwestern United States. The analysis indicated that for every dollar spent on 
mitigation, it saved anywhere from $3 to $5 on future losses.160 This type of analysis 
makes a powerful argument for focusing federal disaster assistance programs on 
mitigation of hazards before disaster strikes. However, as highlighted in a Congressional 
Research Service report in 2011, increases in losses are outpacing FEMA mitigation 
efforts by a factor of 10 to 1.161 Regardless, the federal government has implemented 
numerous programs to promote mitigation. 
In 1988, Congress passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, commonly referred to as the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act is the 
statutory authority for federal involvement in providing disaster assistance. A major 
component of mitigation efforts implemented as part of the Stafford Act is the Pre-
Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP). Both programs provide funding to state and local jurisdictions to develop 
mitigation plans and implement mitigation projects for all hazards that could impact a 
community. 
The current fiscal year (FY) 2016 PDM grant program provides $90 million to 
state and local jurisdictions.162 Current priorities are the development of mitigation plans 
and projects and the funding of projects that are identified as climate resilient mitigation 
activities (CRMA), wildfire mitigation activities, non-flood mitigation activities, flood 
mitigation activities, and emergency power for critical facilities.163 The HMGP differs 
from other programs in that funding is connected to the amount of federal disaster 
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assistance funding allocated under a major disaster declaration. Under the HMGP, 15 to 
20 percent of federal public assistance and individual assistance dollars are allocated to 
mitigation projects.164 The majority of HMGP dollars should be assigned to projects 
associated with the type of disaster resulting in the major disaster declaration. However, a 
percentage may be used for all-hazard projects. 
While numerous initiatives were launched to address the mitigation of all hazards, 
the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant Program was focused on the mitigation of 
flood hazards. The FMA Grant Program was authorized as part of the National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 1994.165 The initial FMA Grant Program provided $20 million a 
year with a 75/25 cost share for eligible projects that dealt with the elevation, acquisition, 
relocation, and demolition of flood-prone structures.166 The Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 greatly expanded the program with a renewed focus on 
mitigating repetitive loss and severe repetitive loss properties.167 The current allocation 
for the FY2016 FMA Grant Program is $199 million with cost sharing percentages 
remaining in place.168 
Each of these mitigation grant programs demonstrates a commitment by the 
federal government to address the reduction of all-hazards. The question is how much 
more is needed to change the long-term trajectory of disaster impacts effectively? 
C. SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE NFIP 
The previous sections have outlined the current NFIP and highlighted several of 
the issues and challenges that the program faces. Since the original passage of the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, which created the NFIP, the program has 
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undergone numerous changes, generally in response to catastrophic flood-related 
disasters that exposed weaknesses in the NFIP. The following sections outline the 
significant legislative changes that have been implemented to address identified 
shortcomings and strengthen the program for future disasters. 
1. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 
In June 1972, Tropical Storm Agnes tracked from Yucatan Peninsula, across 
Florida, and settled over the northeastern United States. The storm produced widespread 
rains of six to 12 inches with some areas receiving 14 to 19 inches and resulted in 
widespread flood across Pennsylvania, Virginia, New York, Maryland, and Ohio.169 The 
storm was responsible for 122 deaths and $2.1 billion in damage, mainly in the 
northeast.170 At the time, the storm cost more in disaster assistance than any previous 
disaster had. The significance of the financial losses was largely attributed to weak 
participation by communities in the NFIP as most were relying on federal disaster 
assistance to provide for recovery.  
As a result of Tropical Storm Agnes, Congress moved to strengthen provisions of 
the National Flood Insurance Act through the passage of the Flood Disaster Protection 
Act of 1973. The act prohibited federal agencies from aiding construction projects for 
communities that did not participate in the NFIP and established mandatory flood 
insurance requirements for properties purchased with federally-backed mortgages located 
in SFHA.171 The result of these changes was a dramatic increase in communities 
participating in the NFIP; it went from 2,200 communities in 1973 to 15,000 
communities by 1977.172 Also, individual policies rose from 100,000 policies in 1972 to 
1,200,000 policies by 1979.173 
                                                 
169 National Hurricane Center, “Hurricanes in History,” accessed August 5, 2016, 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/#agnes.  
170 Ibid.  
171 “History and Purpose of the National Flood Insurance Program,” YouTube video, posted by Gary 
Taylor, October 15, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bs1GxuksrFw.  
172 Ibid.  
173 Ibid.  
 42
2. National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 
In 1993, major riverine flooding along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers caused 
major flooding across North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, 
Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois and resulted in 50 deaths and nearly $15 billion in 
damage.174 At the time, the disaster was considered to be one of the most significant and 
damaging natural disasters to impact the United States. The following year, Congress 
passed the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 to decrease the financial burden 
of flooding through increased participation in the NFIP. The following elements were 
implemented to address the objective of the legislation: 
 Established fines for mortgage lenders that failed to ensure the mandatory 
purchase of flood insurance on properties located in special flood hazard 
areas; 
 Increased the coverage limits of National Flood Insurance Program flood 
insurance policies;  
 Provided supplemental increased cost of compliance coverage to assist 
property owners with the cost of bringing flood-damaged properties into 
compliance with local ordinances; 
 Established the flood mitigation grant program to help states and 
communities develop and implement mitigation measures that reduce 
future flood damage;  
 Codified the National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating 
System, which rates communities and provides them financial incentives 
to adopt floodplain management standards above those set by the National 
Flood Insurance Program; and 
 Required FEMA to assess its flood hazard map inventory at least once 
every five years.175 
3. Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 
The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 was established by Congress to address 
repetitive loss claims within the NFIP. Two grant programs were created to address both 
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repetitive loss properties and severe repetitive loss properties through acquisition, 
demolition, relocation, or structurally elevation of structures. 
As FEMA described:  
The severe repetitive loss grant program is designed to reduce or eliminate 
claims under the National Flood Insurance Program through project 
activities that will result in the greatest savings to the National Flood 
Insurance Fund in the shortest period of time.176  
The severe repetitive loss grant program differed from other mitigation grant programs 
due to penalties that could be imposed on property owners who declined mitigation 
assistance through increases in NFIP premium rates.177 The program required 
participation by the local community with requirements for both enforcement of 
floodplain management ordinances and a local match of federal grant funds. 
The act also called for the implementation of a repetitive loss mitigation grant 
program designed to promote mitigation measures to reduce flood damages to insured 
properties that have had more than one claim to the NFIP. The repetitive loss grant 
program differs from the severe repetitive loss grant program in that it does not require 
local matching funds. 
The repetitive loss and severe repetitive loss grant programs represented the 
primary initiatives of the 2004 NFIP reform act. Other initiatives included boosting 
policyholder awareness about individual flood insurance policies, increasing the 
availability of policyholder information on guidance about the flood insurance claims 
process, and establishing training requirements for insurance professionals.178 
4. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 
The disastrous losses associated with the hurricane seasons in the mid-2000s 
severely impacted the fiscal solvency of the NFIP. The U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) concluded that the NFIP “is unlikely to generate sufficient revenue to 
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cover future catastrophic losses or repay the billions of dollars borrowed from the 
Department of Treasury.”179 To strengthen the fiscal solvency of the NFIP, Congress 
passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12). Key 
provisions of the legislation required implementation of changes to the NFIP that would 
phase out subsidized NFIP flood insurance premiums and raise rates to reflect the true 
flood risk. Also, the legislation called for changes in how FEMA published updated 
FIRMs, including provisions for improved communication to impacted policyholders. 
As noted by FEMA, approximately 20 percent of policies receive subsidies under 
the NFIP (commonly referred to as pre-FIRM properties).180 For subsidized non-
primary/secondary residences, properties that have experienced repetitive losses, and 
business/non-residential properties in the SFHA changes were implemented to increase 
NFIP flood insurance premium rates by 25 percent annually until the rates reflected the 
true risk.181 Primary residences in SFHAs would keep subsidized rates until the property 
was sold, the policy lapsed, the property suffered repetitive or significant flood losses, or 
a new policy was purchased, at which time full-risk rates would apply.182 Also, 
“grandfathered” rates would be phased out at a 20 percent increase per year when new or 
updated FIRMs were adopted by a local community.183 FEMA was also tasked with 
conducting a study on the affordability of the NFIP; it was completed by the National 
Academies of Sciences in 2015 and 2016.184 
As changes to NFIP flood insurance rates were being initiated, property owners 
who had received the benefit of subsidized flood insurance rates rallied against the 
implemented changes. In particular, coastal communities were quick to petition 
congressional representatives to delay the implementation of adjustments to flood 
insurance rates. They claimed the changes would gut housing markets and devastate local 
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economies, which were already reeling from the impacts of recent hurricanes.185 
Congressional resolve to improve the NFIP fiscal solvency through the measures required 
by BW-12 quickly began to dissolve as constituents voiced their concerns. In response, 
through the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Congress included provisions to 
prohibit implementation of certain flood insurance rate increases while a new law was 
developed.186 
5. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 
As a permanent measure to address the controversial components of the BW-12, 
Congress implemented the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 
(HFIAA), which repealed or modified certain provisions enacted in 2012 and made 
additional changes to the NFIP program. Those provisions included the following: 
 Refunds: A refund program was initiated for certain flood insurance 
policies that were affected by the pre-FIRM subsidy elimination. Pre-
FIRM subsidized rates were reinstated for those policies impacted by the 
provisions of BW-12. 
 Premium rates for subsidized policies: Provisions to increase subsidized 
flood insurance policies to full-risk rates were reduced under the HFIAA. 
With few exceptions, rate increases were reduced to 18 percent annually 
versus the original provision for increases of 25 percent annually. Also, 
pre-FIRM rates can be transferred to a new owner when a property is sold, 
pending additional provisions from FEMA. 
 New surcharge on all policies: As a new provision, implemented a 
surcharge on all NFIP flood insurance policies. A surcharge of $25 is 
applied to policies on primary residences and $250 on all other policies. 
The surcharge will remain in effect until all pre-FIRM subsidies are 
eliminated. 
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 Grandfathering: Repealed the provisions of BW-12 that required the 
phasing out of grandfathered NFIP flood insurance properties.  
 Flood insurance advocate: Requires FEMA to designate flood insurance 
advocate to advocate for NFIP policyholders.187 
The HFIAA includes additional provisions to continue to address issues 
associated with the NFIP. One of those provisions that will likely result in additional 
enhancements of the NFIP is the requirement for development of an NFIP affordability 
framework. Under the provisions of the HFIAA, FEMA is required to develop the 
affordability framework within 18 months of completion of the affordability study 
provisioned under BW-12.188 Guidance in the legislation for the framework is focused on 
improved communication of flood risk, targeted financial assistance for low-income 
populations, additional focus on mitigation actions, and considerations of the impact of 
increases in premium rates and updates to FIRMs.189 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
It is important to understand why federal policymakers chose to expand the role 
of government to provide insurance for flood losses. Federal disaster assistance data 
clearly indicates the prominence of flooding and flood-related hazards as the most 
significant hazard in the United States. It accounts for 78.2 percent of all major disaster 
declarations from 1953 through 2015.190 A review of the nation’s early history indicates 
flooding has always been a significant issue, especially along the major rivers that play a 
prominent role in agriculture, industry, and commerce. For example, the Great 
Mississippi River Flood of 1927 served as a turning point for federal policymakers to 
initiate multibillion-dollar flood control programs to tame the nation’s major rivers. As 
highlighted in the book Disasters and Democracy: 
Few natural events have had a more lasting impact on our engineering 
concepts, economic thought, and political policy in the field of floods. 
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Prior to 1927 control of floods in the United States was considered largely 
a local responsibility. Soon after 1927, the control of floods became a 
national problem and a federal responsibility.191 
Despite the increased role of the federal government in managing flood control 
measures, “disaster assistance was viewed as a moral responsibility of neighbors, 
churches, charities, and communities.”192 By the 1950s, private insurance for flood losses 
was largely non-existent and efforts to limit development in floodplains was given little 
more than verbal support.193 Federal support for flood victims of Hurricane Betsy served 
as a turning point for expanded government involvement in assisting communities and 
individuals with flood hazards. The passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 
which established the NFIP, initiated a new era of federal government involvement in 
identifying, managing, and assisting communities and individuals from the threat of 
flooding.  
The primary components of the NFIP seek to provide for the hazard identification 
and risk assessment of flood hazards, minimize the impact of flooding through floodplain 
management, and they have the underlying objective of insurance as “the preferred 
mechanism for disaster assistance.”194 Each of these components contributes to reducing 
the risk and impact from flood hazards on communities and individuals. However, nearly 
50 years after passage of the NFIP, flooding remains the most significant and costly 
hazard in the United States and requires seemingly never ending support from the federal 
government to manage risk and provide recovery assistance.  
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III. DOES THE NFIP LIMIT RISK REDUCTION? 
The previous chapter outlined the evolution of federal involvement in flood 
disasters that resulted in the creation of the NFIP, outlined the current scope of the NFIP 
programs, and highlighted some of the critical issues that continue to compromise the 
program. This chapter seeks to apply our understanding of the NFIP to the question, to 
what extent is the NFIP limiting risk reduction and serving as an example of a federal 
disaster assistance program contributing to the rise of a moral hazard? 
As previously outlined, the concept of moral hazard is based on how the 
redistribution of risk negatively changes behavior—that the transfer of risk will result in 
the “tendency to take risks or alter behavior, because the negative costs or consequences 
that could result will not be felt by the person taking the risk.”195 It is worth examining 
what components of the NFIP potentially limit risk reduction and contribute to a moral 
hazard. Three components offer insight on limitations of the program to meet its 
objective to prevent future loss of life and property from the hazard of flooding. 
Repetitive loss properties, pre-FIRM subsidized policies, and the inability of the program 
to absorb the impact of significant flood events are all elements that hinder the ability of 
the program to meet its long-term objective. Examining each of these identified factors in 
relation to the concept of moral hazard can provide insight on whether the NFIP limits 
risk reduction. 
A. REPETITIVE LOSS PROPERTIES 
Repetitive loss properties are insured properties that have filed multiple NFIP 
flood insurance claims due to repetitive flood losses. The continued coverage of 
repetitive loss properties represents one of the clearest and most obvious indicators of the 
NFIP limiting risk reduction and contributing to the rise of a moral hazard. As provided 
in the definitions of moral hazard from insurance and economics, allowing for repetitive 
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loss in the NFIP is indicative of the “tendency for insurance against loss to reduce 
incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss.”196  
FEMA’s administration of the NFIP identifies repetitive loss properties and a 
subset of those properties, identified as severe repetitive loss properties, as a critical issue 
with special attention applied to mitigating flood hazards for those properties. FEMA 
NFIP flood insurance claim and loss data indicates that while repetitive loss properties 
only account for approximately 3.8 percent of NFIP policies (as outlined in Appendix C) 
they account for 35.5 percent of claims and 30.5 percent of claim payments.197 FEMA 
has also estimated that 90 percent of repetitive loss properties were constructed before the 
publishing of FIRMs for those locations, which gives an indication of the high-risk the 
program assumed without a clear methodology to mitigate the risk in the long-term.198 
NFIP policies specifically prevent FEMA from refusing coverage to any policyholder in a 
participating NFIP community and cannot compel property owners to mitigate losses or 
impose actuarial rates on repetitive loss properties; these represent policies that would 
never be supported by private insurance providers.199 The policy elements that allowed 
for the insuring of properties without an understanding of risk, automatic coverage 
without the requirement to reduce the risk, and provide a guaranteed coverage without 
risk of cancellation, all demonstrate an asymmetric transfer of risk from the property 
owner to the government. Each of these policy elements creates a framework in which 
moral hazard can exist and risk reduction is not incentivized.  
Part of the underlying inquiry related to the NFIP limiting risk reduction is a 
determination of whether policyholders truly understand the risk of a flood impacting 
their property. Related to repetitive loss properties, the answer appears obvious given that 
once a property suffers a loss from a flood, it would remain at risk unless some action 
was taken to reduce future risk. This supports the moral hazard argument that individuals 
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have the full understanding of the risks they face. However, as explained by Kousky and 
Shabman:  
If individuals fully understood disaster risks, however, they would be 
aware of the many costs of disasters not covered by aid or insurance: the 
suffering and worry; the time lost to recovery and rebuilding; the loss of 
irreplaceable items, particularly those that may carry sentimental value, 
such as family photographs; not to mention the possibility of injury or 
even loss of life.200 
As noted, 90 percent of repetitive loss properties are pre-FIRM properties that 
were constructed before the risk was assessed and communicated.201 While properties 
that suffer repetitive losses should have an understanding of the risk of flooding, the 
question remains: are those property owners in a position to adjust the risk of flooding 
through mitigation measures? 
FEMA has continuously attempted to address the issue of repetitive loss 
properties through developing methods to mitigate flood losses and providing mitigation 
grant funding for the acquisition, demolition, relocation, or flood proofing of properties. 
Congress has supported these efforts through various mitigation grants and the Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2004, which was specifically implemented based on the issues 
associated with repetitive loss properties. Despite these efforts, “the annual increase in 
new repetitive loss properties is outpacing FEMA mitigation efforts by a factor of 10 to 
1.”202 Furthermore, as highlighted by Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “many residents living in 
hazard-prone areas not only lack interest in purchasing natural hazard insurance and 
keeping it, they also rarely undertake voluntary loss-prevention measures to protect their 
property.”203 Many factors contribute to the failure of individuals to mitigate the risk, 
including “a lack of accurate knowledge about risk; budget constraints; and myopia.”204 
Mitigation of flood risk—specifically, elevating high-risk properties above the base flood 
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elevation—has been demonstrated to be an effective risk reduction measure.205 However, 
elevating an existing structure comes with a significant cost that would only be paid back 
over an extended period; this leaves little incentive to make such an investment over the 
short-term.206 While the evidence supports that mitigation measures are an effective 
methodology to reduce flood risk, they require a long-term perspective that investment in 
reducing the risk is preferred to maintaining the status quo provided through the 
insurance program that would only require those measures in the most extreme 
circumstances. 
An analysis of NFIP flood insurance claims shows that repetitive losses have 
remained a constant percentage of total flood insurance claims throughout the history of 
the NFIP, regardless of what actions have been initiated to reduce repetitive loss.  
Figures 3 and 4 provide an annual comparison of total NFIP flood insurance claims and 
costs in relation to repetitive loss property claims and costs. The percentage of claims 
associated with repetitive loss properties has remained relatively steady over the course 
of the flood insurance program. However, the percentage of costs related to repetitive 
loss properties has shown a general downward trend. Of note is the relatively small 
percentage of claims and costs associated with repetitive loss properties in the historical 
loss years of 2005 (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita), 2008 (Hurricane Ike), and 2012 
(Hurricane Sandy). A probable explanation for this anomaly is the massive scope of 
impacts from these hurricanes extending well beyond areas identified as high-risk for 
flooding. The evidence indicates that repetitive loss claims remain an ongoing problem 
for the NFIP. That public policy has not reduced those properties that remain at a high 
risk of repeatedly being impacted by flooding. Conversely, trends also indicate that losses 
associated with repetitive loss properties are declining; this is perhaps indicative that the 
NFIP is reducing the magnitude of impacts from flood events.  
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Figure 3.  Flood Insurance Loss Claims (1978–2015), Total Claims versus 
Repetitive Loss Claims207 
 
Figure 4.  Flood Insurance Loss Dollars Paid (1978–2015), Total Losses versus 
Repetitive Losses208 
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capped at 100,000 to improve the display of the information; 2005 claims totaled 213,587 and 2012 claims 
totaled 150,832.  
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Moral hazard is an important element in considering the issue of repetitive loss 
properties209 since they are documented as a clear and obvious issue for the NFIP. While 
repetitive loss properties account for a small percentage of flood insurance policies, they 
account for a disproportionately significant number of claims and associated costs. The 
data shows that generally these properties are located in high-risk areas and were 
constructed before the assessment of risk through the NFIP mapping process. As a result, 
the vast majority of repetitive loss properties pay subsidized pre-FIRM flood insurance 
rates.210 Whereas the implementation of mitigation measures has proven to be effective at 
reducing vulnerability, research indicates that most property owners are indifferent to 
mitigation programs due to “a lack of accurate knowledge about risk; budget constraints; 
and myopia.”211 Furthermore, NFIP policies that provide insurance coverage without the 
requirement to reduce risk and that guarantee coverage without risk of cancellation limit 
the incentive to reduce risk. 
B. PRE-FIRM SUBSIDIZED POLICIES 
Historically, the catastrophic nature of flooding limits the ability to develop a rate 
structure that adequately reflects the full risk to flood-prone properties.212 Based on this 
issue, a private insurance market that can profitably provide flood insurance at an 
affordable price has not emerged. This lack of a market has pressed the government to 
undertake a “public program that encompasses social goals” where a private market 
failed to emerge.213 It also created the economic challenge of government management of 
a flawed market model. Given the correlated risk of property owners located in high-risk 
flood zones, the use of traditional insurance principles to gather a large pool of 
independent risks to reduce the risk to the insurance program was not possible.214 These 
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circumstances give rise to the government using flood insurance subsidies to build and 
maintain participation in the NFIP.  
Similar to the continued coverage of repetitive loss properties, the use flood 
insurance subsidies appears to represent a clear indicator of the NFIP limiting risk 
reduction and contributing to the rise of moral hazard. Flood insurance provided by the 
NFIP is based on two general classes of properties: those insured at full actuarial rates 
and those insured at subsidized rates.215 Congress authorized subsidized rates for 
structures constructed before the effective date of a FIRM as an important aspect of the 
NFIP’s startup process to encourage participation and to avoid unfairly penalizing 
homeowners who built before the program was established.216 The NFIP includes 
grandfathered premiums that allow a subsidized rate class to continue even if a new 
FIRM indicates a higher level of flood risk.217 Regulators believed these policies would 
be phased out over time as properties were lost to age or flooding. An initial estimate in a 
1966 housing and urban development report predicted subsidies would be needed for 
about 25 years.218 However, the useful life of buildings has been significantly extended 
by modern construction techniques, with at least one FEMA report estimating the need 
for subsidies continuing until 2050.219 According to FEMA, subsidized and 
grandfathered rates have declined from 75 percent of policies in 1978 to the current 
estimated 20 percent of policies; this currently equates to over one million policies.220 
Pre-FIRM subsidized and grandfathered policies typically pay 40 to 45 percent of 
the full actuarial rates charged to other policyholders.221 Pre-FIRM properties are exempt 
from many of the NFIP’s floodplain management requirements unless they are 
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substantial damaged or undergo substantial improvements.222 The NFIP attempts to 
recoup lost revenue from pre-FIRM subsidized policies through post-FIRM revenues and 
cover grandfathered policies by charging higher premiums across all other policies in the 
shared flood zone.  
A private insurance provider would not share the government policies that 
establish and maintain the pre-FIRM discounts. As stated by the American Academy of 
Actuaries, “At times, Congress and FEMA have prioritized societal and marketing goals, 
such as increasing the policies in force and gaining acceptance of new FIRMs by affected 
communities, over developing and maintaining full-risk rates.”223 FEMA’s actuarial rate 
review justifies public policy providing insurance at less than full-risk rates as an 
extension of disaster assistance: 
It was anticipated that very high premiums would cause great resistance to 
insurance purchase. However, with reasonable premiums, property owners 
purchasing insurance at less than full-risk rates would still be funding at 
least part of their recovery from flood damage. This was considered 
preferable to the previous arrangement of disaster relief that came solely 
from taxpayer funding.224 
These elements are consistent with social contract theory and economics view of 
moral hazard: the theory that government should intervene when a market is unwilling to 
provide societal insurance, thus providing for the “common good.” While federal 
policymakers have worked to reduce subsidies and move the flood insurance program 
towards the goal of being actuarial sound, there will always remain a percentage of 
policyholders who would not be protected except for government intervention. 
Similar to repetitive loss properties, pre-FIRM discounted policies represent a 
significant disproportionate percentage of claims and costs. The GAO has estimated that 
pre-FIRM discounted policies experience up to five times more flood damage than 
properties built in compliance with NFIP regulations.225 Common sense seems to dictate 
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that higher numbers of claims and losses should have been anticipated. By their very 
definition, pre-FIRM properties were constructed before the assessment of risk through 
the NFIP mapping process and the implementation of floodplain management 
requirements. Although assistance to reduce the risk of flooding through mitigation 
programs is available for pre-FIRM properties, as previously outlined research indicates, 
most property owners are indifferent to mitigation programs.226 As posited by 
Kunreuther and others, “[subsidies] undermine the incentives for policyholders to carry 
out mitigation measures… because the subsidized rates are not affected by such 
measures.”227 While progress has been made to reduce the number of pre-FIRM 
properties, a significant number of high-risk properties remain in high-risk zones. 
FEMA uses the combination of subsidized and full-risk premiums to generate 
revenue sufficient to cover a “historical average loss year.”228 By authorizing and 
continuing to use pre-FIRM subsidized and grandfathered policies, “it is impractical for 
the NFIP to be actuarially sound in the aggregate.”229 While FEMA has worked to 
address the impacts of discounted premiums, its continued use limits the ability of the 
NFIP to maintain fiscal solvency when faced with catastrophic losses.230 As a result of 
the catastrophic loss years of 2005 (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita) and 2008 (Hurricane 
Ike), FEMA requested 18 short-term funding extensions of the NFIP resulting in close to 
$18 billion in debt to the U.S. Treasury.231 Given the fiscal bankruptcy of the NFIP, 
political forces from across the spectrum petitioned Congress to improve the financial 
sustainability of the NFIP.232 The result was a sweeping reform of the NFIP with the 
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overwhelming bipartisan passage of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2012 (BW-12).233 
BW-12 initiated the phasing out of subsidized and grandfathered policies in 
addition to other program changes.234 FEMA maintained that 81 percent of NFIP 
policyholders already pay actuarial rates and would not be directly impacted by BW-
12.235 The remaining 19 percent of policyholders that pay discounted premiums were 
affected by BW-12 based on the classification of their property. For the approximate five 
percent of policies for non-primary residences, businesses, and repetitive loss properties, 
BW-12 initiated an immediate 25 percent increase annually until flood insurance rates 
reflect the full risk.236 For the approximate 10 percent of subsidized primary residences, 
BW-12 would not impact the subsidies until the property was sold or the policy lapsed.237 
The remaining four percent of properties, including subsidized multifamily structures, 
were placed in a hold status until additional guidance could be developed.238 BW-12 also 
phased out grandfathered rates with a 20 percent annual increase until full-risk rates were 
achieved.239 The provisions of BW-12 to phase out subsidies and grandfathering 
provisions of the NFIP were aimed at restoring the NFIP to solid financial health.240  
As the provisions of BW-12 began to take effect, the backlash against the rate 
increases associated with the legislation was swift. In 2013 reports began surfacing of 
massive premium increases for policyholders in high-risk areas that redefined flood 
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insurance reform arguments away from the long-term sustainability of the NFIP.241 In 
addition, local grassroots efforts combined with support from lobbying organizations 
worked to “reframe the issue away from sound environmental policy and fiscal 
prudence… [to] now revolve around the plight of local economies, homeowners, and the 
still-recovering housing market.”242 In response, Congress was quick to respond to the 
outcry with a reversal of the strongest provisions of BW-12.243 
In early 2014, Congress reinstated the discounts for most policyholders and 
slowed the increase for others with the passage of the HFIAA. The interaction between 
Congress and policyholders exemplifies the core essence of moral hazard; when people 
do not assume the full risk of an action or decision, they are not inclined to make a fully 
responsible or moral choice. As the economic argument for moral hazard declares, 
“people never would have flocked to the Jersey shore or Florida coast… had the 
government not offered the phony protection of subsidized insurance.”244 As further 
explained by Justice Scalia, these interactions help to show that the govermentalization of 
charity leads to the transformation of charity into legal entitlement.245 The continuation 
of NFIP subsidies and grandfathered discounted premiums has effectively transformed 
the program into a legal entitlement for many policyholders; this limits the options for 
decision makers. As summarized by Bjorn Beer, 
Biggert-Waters represented a rare moment when fiscal and environmental 
common sense overlapped just long enough for policymakers to look 
beyond the horizon of a 30-year mortgage. The undoing of these reforms 
proves that our political system can’t even see past the horizon of the next 
election. Perhaps it is all a reflection of what behavioral scientists say is 
Homo sapiens’ hard-wired myopia. We’ve evolved an excellent ability to 
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notice short-term dangers like a spike in our insurance, but we’re lousy at 
seeing long-term threats like sea level rise.246 
C. SIGNIFICANT FLOOD EVENTS 
The NFIP is not structured to withstand claims and losses associated with a 
catastrophic loss year; it uses the borrowing authority with the U.S. Treasury to cover 
excessive losses.247 On the contrary, the NFIP has been structured to cover claims 
associated with a “historical average loss year.”248 Nevertheless, before Hurricane 
Katrina, the NFIP had generally remained fiscally solvent, only needing to borrow funds 
from the U.S. Treasury four times since the mid-1980s and repaid the debt each time.249 
In many ways, this is a testament to the sound management and administration of the 
program. 
Unfortunately, the catastrophic losses associated with the 2004, 2005, 2008, and 
2012 hurricane seasons created a fiscal crisis requiring intercession. Should the 
catastrophic losses of these historic hurricane seasons serve as an indictment of the 
failures of the program to prepare for repeated significant losses or simply be written off 
as an anomaly that should be covered as federal disaster assistance? Perhaps the answer is 
that both assertions are correct. The NFIP is conceived as a social program that is 
legislatively limited when it comes to addressing the potential for catastrophic losses.250 
This creates a mechanism by which policymakers have undermined the ability of the 
program to achieve actuarial soundness required to address catastrophic losses.251 In 
addition, the NFIP is an extension of federal disaster assistance programs.252 The severe 
hurricane impacts from 2004 through 2012 represent one of the most costly disaster 
periods in United States history. In particular, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy pushed all 
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aspects of government, private, and non-profit disaster assistance programs beyond the 
breaking point; the NFIP was no exception. 
A review of the history of federal involvement in responding to floods shows that 
every time government intervention has been challenged by disaster, programs are 
adjusted to meet the emerging challenge. Figure 5 provides a “cause and effect” chain of 
major flood-related disasters and the legislative response to those disasters. It also 
highlights the limitations of policymakers, who have difficulty seeing past the scope of 




Figure 5.  Diagram Depicting the Cause and Effect Relationship between 
Significant Flood Disasters and the Resulting Legislation 
Throughout the history of the NFIP, significant loss events have accounted for a 
greater and greater percentage of flood insurance claims and losses (see Figures 6 and 7). 
While the numbers vary significantly from year-to-year pending on impacts from 
disasters, significant loss events currently average 64 percent of claims and 84 percent of 
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losses for the NFIP.253 Given that the NFIP was never designed to fund catastrophic 
losses, it should not be surprising that the program could not fiscally manage the historic 
hurricane impacts of 2004 through 2012. Kousky and Shabman acknowledge that even if 
the program were fully funded at actuarial rates, it would not be able to absorb those 
catastrophic losses.254 From this perspective, policymakers should recognize the 
limitations of how the program is formulated and simply write off these catastrophic 
losses as part of federal disaster assistance. 
 
Figure 6.  Flood Insurance Loss Claims (1978–2015) Total Claims versus Significant 
Event Claims255 
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Figure 7.  Flood Insurance Loss Dollars Paid (1978–2015) Totals Losses versus 
Significant Event Losses256 
 
However, addressing the catastrophic impacts of recent disasters may only 
represent the tip of the iceberg for the issue of significant loss events. Given the predicted 
impacts of climate change related to the threat of flooding, significant loss events are 
forecasted to become far more widespread, and they may represent the single greatest 
threat to the long-term sustainment of the NFIP. A study completed for FEMA on the 
impacts of climate change indicates that by the year 2100, the average increase in SFHA 
nationally may be approximately 40 to 45 percent, and no significant decreases in the 
floodplain depth and SFHA are anticipated in any region of the United States.257 Also, 
the study indicates that the need for NFIP flood insurance policies may increase by 80 to 
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100 percent due to both population growth in SFHAs (by 30 percent) and climate change 
increasing the size of SFHAs (by 70 percent).258 
The impact of significant loss events is clearly a threat to the long-term 
sustainability of the NFIP. Policymakers must continue to address the fiscal challenges 
facing the program by placing it in a more financial sound framework that allows for 
improved management of the program when faced with significant loss events. 
Furthermore, hazard identification and floodplain management policies must start to 
address the estimated impacts of climate change increasing the threat of flooding. Finally, 
policymakers must proactively deal with the emerging challenge of climate change or 
risk the collapse of the NFIP from sustained significant loss event impacts. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. THE MORAL HAZARD ARGUMENT 
Moral hazard is a concept originalting in the early insurance industry with broad 
application in economics, law, and policy debate. Moral hazard is defined as when people 
do not assume the full risk of an action or decision, they are not inclined to make a fully 
responsible or moral choice; how the redistribution of risk adversely changes people’s 
behavior.259 With the expansion of federal government involvement in providing disaster 
assistance, many commentators have asserted that government involvement contributes to 
the rise of moral hazard and reduces incentives to reduce risk.260 
Does federal involvement in provision of disaster assistance limit risk reduction 
and contribute to the rise of a moral hazard? Though I concede that moral hazard cannot 
be universally applied to all disaster assistance programs, many of these programs share 
commonalities with insurance, wherein the concept of moral hazard originated. It is from 
this perspective that an examination of the NFIP can provide insight into the unintended 
consequences of government involvement in providing disaster assistance may not only 
limit risk reduction but also may give rise to a moral hazard. 
1. The Challenge of Floods 
It has been argued that flooding and flood-related hazards are the most prominent 
and significant hazards in the United States. A review of the historical impacts of 
flooding demonstrates the lasting impact that flooding has historically had on the nation’s 
“engineering concepts, economic thought, and political policy.”261 The initiation point 
for federal involvement in providing disaster assistance can traced to the transition of 
flood control measures from a local community responsibility to a federal government 
responsibility following the Great Mississippi River Flood of 1927. The evolution of 
federal government providing disaster assistance continued to expand with the significant 
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impacts of Hurricane Betsy in 1965, which resulted in the passage of the Southeast 
Hurricane Disaster Relief Act. This act included provisions to conduct a feasibility study 
of the federal government providing a national program for flood insurance. Findings 
from that study resulted in the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 
which created the NFIP and tasked the federal government with the responsibility of 
conducting flood hazard identification and risk assessment, coordinating floodplain 
management, and providing flood insurance. 
Over the course of the last half-century, the federal government role has 
continued to expand and evolve with the government taking an ever-increasing role in 
providing disaster assistance. While government programs are designed to address all 
hazards, flooding and flood-related impacts account for the vast majority of direct 
economic losses as well as for 78.2 percent of all major disaster declarations.262 Given 
that the NFIP is the principal federal program designated to address the hazard of 
flooding, it provides a model example for the study of how government involvement can 
limit risk reduction. Furthermore, findings may provide perspective on how government 
involvement in disaster assistance might contribute to the rise of a moral hazard.  
2. The Role of the NFIP in Reducing Risk 
The NFIP was created as a mitigation program with the goal of preventing future 
loss of life and property from the hazard of flooding. Policymakers have used the NFIP as 
an extension of disaster recovery, noting “[flood insurance] was considered preferable to 
the previous arrangement of disaster relief that came solely from taxpayer funding.”263 
The NFIP consists of three main elements: flood hazard identification and risk 
assessment, floodplain management, and flood insurance.  
Through the NFIP flood hazard identification and risk assessment component, the 
federal government identifies flood-prone areas and maps zones at risk for flooding. The 
standard tool for communicating risk to a community and its residents is the FIRM. Areas 
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at high risk for flooding are identified as SFHAs, based on the 100-year base flood 
elevation in areas prone to flood water inundation or based on wave action or storm surge 
in coastal areas. Additional flood hazard information is communicated on FIRMs to 
provide a graphic assessment of the total flood hazard present in a community. The flood 
hazard identification and risk assessment information are used to determine requirements 
for floodplain management and flood insurance. 
The NFIP goal to reduce losses and damages caused by flooding is primarily 
addressed through the establishment of floodplain management standards, which are 
designed to mitigate the flood hazard. For a community to participate in the NFIP, it must 
adopt floodplain management ordinances that adhere to the minimum standards 
established at the federal level.264 The intent of these standards is not to prohibit 
development, but rather to ensure that development is constructed in such a way as to be 
protected from a base flood event. While the federal government establishes the 
standards, the land-use authority required to regulate floodplain development is a power 
reserved by the Constitution to states and delegated to the respective state’s political 
subdivisions (local jurisdictions).265 Hence, while the federal government establishes the 
standards for floodplain management, state and local jurisdictions must adopt and enforce 
the standards to mitigate the hazard. The federal government further promotes the 
adoption of best practices by state and local jurisdictions through the CRS program, 
which incentivizes these actions by offering flood insurance discounts. 
The NFIP indemnifies individuals from flood losses through the flood insurance 
program providing coverage for business and residential structures as well as content 
protection.266 The flood insurance program is considered an extension of disaster 
assistance funded by policyholders to lessen the impact on taxpayers who would 
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otherwise be called upon to assist through other federal disaster assistance programs.267 
The flood insurance program is administered through a partnership between FEMA and 
private insurance providers, which facilitate the sale and servicing of flood insurance. 
Flood insurance premiums are set on the basis of covering the “historical average loss 
year” versus collecting premiums sufficient to cover claims from catastrophic losses with 
provisions to borrow from the U.S. Treasury when the NFIF has insufficient funds to pay 
claims.268 
To summarize, the NFIP is designed as a flood mitigation program that identifies 
and assesses flood hazards, coordinates floodplain management, and provides flood 
insurance. The NFIP currently has over 22,000 communities participating with more than 
5.2 million policies in force providing total coverage in excess of $1.2 trillion.269 The 
NFIP has generally remained fiscally solvent for much of its history.270 However, the 
catastrophic losses associated with the impacts of 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2012 hurricane 
seasons has generated $24 billion in debt to the U.S. Treasury with revenue unlikely to 
cover future catastrophic losses or repay the billions of dollars in debt.271 Given the 
current fiscal crisis facing the program, analysis of program elements hampering the 
sound administration of the program can provide insight into program elements that limit 
risk reduction.  
B. NFIP STUDY FINDINGS 
The following section highlights findings from the case study of the NFIP and 
applies those findings to the broader scope of federal government involvement in 
providing disaster assistance.  
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1. How the NFIP Limits Risk Reduction 
I am of two minds about the NFIP’s role in limiting risk reduction. On the one 
hand, the program provides a framework for the identification and assessment of flood 
risk, provides a methodology to reduce risk through the establishment of floodplain 
management standards, provides flood insurance to indemnify individuals for flood 
losses where a private insurance market failed to emerge, and offers mitigation programs 
to reduce overall risk. On the other hand, the program allows for repetitive loss without 
mechanisms to refuse future coverage, compel policyholders to mitigate against future 
loss, or impose actuarial rates as a penalty for repetitive claims. Moreover, nearly 50 
years after initiation of the NFIP, the program continues to provide pre-FIRM subsidies 
and grandfathered rates for high-risk properties that undermine the use of mitigation 
measures to effectively reduce long-term risk. 
When it comes to the topics of the repetitive loss and pre-FIRM subsidies, most of 
us would readily agree these policies weaken the fiscal solvency of the NFIP, which 
requires taxpayers to accept greater financial risk from future catastrophic losses. Where 
the agreement usually ends, however, is the question of how to effectively address policy 
shortcomings. Whereas some are convinced that these policies must be phased out to 
provide for the long-term sustainability of the NFIP, others maintain that elimination of 
these policies would reduce participation in the NFIP and negatively impact local 
economies and housing markets. 
By focusing on the implications of sustainability and fiscal solvency, the 
continuation of these policies overlooks the deeper problem of limiting risk reduction. 
The majority of repetitive loss and pre-FIRM properties are located in high-risk areas. 
While losses associated with flooding have significant impacts beyond the physical 
damage to structures and belongings, many chose to rebuild and remain because there is 
little concern of losing their flood insurance coverage or being required to implement 
costly mitigation measures against future losses. Furthermore, the use of subsidized rates 
for pre-FIRM or grandfathered policies removes the incentive to mitigate or reduce the 
risk as the implementation of those measures does little to change the cost of flood 
insurance. Ultimately, what is at stake here is that these policies allow for life and 
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property to be placed at greater risk of experiencing loss from flooding. In the end, the 
transfer of risk from the policyholder to the government has resulted in a disincentive to 
reduce risk and promoted the rise of a moral hazard. 
2. Failure to Prepare for Future Disasters 
In Chapter III, it is outlined how the NFIP has not been structured to withstand 
claims and losses associated with catastrophic losses; instead relying on its borrowing 
authority with the U.S. Treasury to cover excessive losses.272 A review of the history of 
federal involvement in provision of assistance for flooding shows a cause and effect 
pattern in which major flood-related disasters exceed existing government response 
capabilities, which requires the paradigm to be reset for the next disaster. The pattern 
highlights the limited view of policymakers, who focus on disasters of the past versus 
promotion of resilience to enhance protections for future threats.  
NFIP claim and loss data support the notion that significant loss events represent 
the most significant challenge to the long-term sustainment of the program. Furthermore, 
trend patterns and studies of the potential impacts of climate change provide an indication 
of these impacts continuing to increase. It should be no surprise that the NFIP is 
financially compromised; it is not structured for catastrophic losses and is repeatedly 
tested by significant loss events. Whereas losses associated with significant loss events 
provide ample evidence that the NFIP is fiscally flawed, it does little to support the 
argument that the NFIP limits risk reduction for individual policyholders. Nevertheless, it 
highlights the shortcomings of policymakers to address an emerging issue that will 
further compromise the NFIP. 
The shortcomings of policymakers to address the sustainment of the NFIP 
presents a parallel argument that there is moral hazard in the current policymaking 
environment. It can be argued that when policymakers limit the sustainability of the NFIP 
to historical average losses versus catastrophic losses, they fail to provide for the long-
term resilience of the program. The legacy of these shortcomings is that the NFIP will 
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continue to be challenged by significant loss events and will not be prepared to deal with 
the emerging hazard of climate change. 
3. Broader Implications of Federal Involvement 
This inquiry looked to explore the extent the NFIP limits risk reduction. While the 
NFIP clearly seeks to reduce risk through each of the main program elements, the 
evidence indicates aspects of the program limit risk reduction, primarily through the 
funding of repetitive loss and use of subsidies. Furthermore, from a broader policy 
perspective, the failure of policymakers to enhance the resilience of the program to 
absorb catastrophic losses has a limiting effect on the long-term sustainability of the 
program. 
What does this perspective tell us about how federal involvement in disaster 
assistance might contribute to the rise of a moral hazard? An important takeaway is that 
federal involvement does not arbitrarily mean that behavior is negatively altered. 
However, it is important to evaluate the extent to which a policy provides benefits 
beyond what would be considered reasonable, thus creating incentives to limit risk 
reduction. 
Kousky and Shabman assert, “there is no compelling evidence for a moral hazard 
in disaster relief programs for households.”273 This is supported by their review of 
available disaster relief for individuals, providing an indication that programs are 
designed to minimize moral hazard through limitations placed on the aid provided.274 
Although I agree with Kousky and Shabman related to individual assistance programs, 
public assistance programs provide an alternative to federal involvement contributing to a 
moral hazard. 
Through the Stafford Act, the federal government provides public assistance to 
state and local communities impacted by major disasters. While jurisdictions must exceed 
a per capita impact to qualify for a major disaster declaration, once issued, at least 75 
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percent of the recovery expense for emergency response measures and restoration of 
public infrastructure is shifted to the federal government—with no cap set on 
assistance.275 The transference of disaster recovery costs offers a similar dynamic to the 
NFIP reducing resolve to minimize risk. From a practitioner’s perspective, this is best 
exhibited through the emphasis that state and local jurisdictions place on preparedness 
and response, while often neglecting mitigation and recovery readiness. Policymakers 
have begun to recognize the need to adjust policy given the substantial financial 
commitments transferred to the federal government when public assistance is included in 
a major disaster declaration (note that 94 percent of major disaster declarations include 
public assistance versus the 45 percent that include individual assistance).276 In response 
to calls from Congress, the GAO, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 
Inspector General, FEMA is exploring the use of a disaster deductible as a means to 
reform how the federal government supports states following a disaster.277 
These findings have important consequences for the broader domain of evaluating 
the unintended consequences of federal involvement in providing disaster assistance. 
While there is an imperative for the government to provide disaster assistance, it is 
important to evaluate whether that assistance negatively alters the risk reduction approach 
of those at risk from the disaster. A continued focus on reducing risk and promoting 
resilience should be at the core of government disaster assistance. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the thesis findings, the following section touches on recommendations 
for resolving policy shortcomings, enhancing the resiliency of the NFIP in the era of 
climate change, and identifies areas for future research. 
                                                 
275 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as 
Amended, 42, vol. 5121 et seq., 1988, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1383153669955-
21f970b19e8eaa67087b7da9f4af706e/stafford_act_booklet_042213_508e.pdf.  
276 William O. Jenkins, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a 
Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648162.pdf, 17.  
277 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Deductible,” accessed May 24, 2016, 
https://www.fema.gov/disaster-deductible.  
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1. Resolve Policy Shortcomings 
In conclusion, as I have suggested, aspects of the NFIP limit risk reduction and 
contribute to the rise of a moral hazard. Specifically, NFIP policies that support 
continued coverage of repetitive loss, use of subsidies to desensitize risk, and failure to 
adjust for catastrophic losses all impact the sustainability and resilience of the program. 
Measures included in BW-12 demonstrate a resolve to enhance the sustainability and 
resilience of the NFIP following the catastrophic losses of the late 2000s. Unfortunately, 
that resolve was short-lived, and many of the major components that addressed those 
shortcomings rolled back with the passage of the HFIAA. Congresswomen Maxine 
Waters, who sponsored both the original reform and reversal, was quick to blame FEMA 
for the legislative backlash with what she termed “bungled management” of the 
reform.278 While it is true that BW-12 resulted in public outcry regarding the rapid 
removal of flood insurance subsidies (phased out over a four- to five-year cycle), it does 
not necessarily follow that these measures were inappropriate. In an analysis of the matter 
in 2010 by Michel-Kerjan, he explains, “It would make sense also to reduce gradually the 
subsidy currently given to these homeowners, perhaps over a period of 10 or 15 years so 
it is easier to do politically.”279 In short, Michel-Kerjan suggested a far more gradual 
phase out of subsidies that may have avoided the political backlash. 
As these issues are inherent to the original implementation of the NFIP, it is 
important for policymakers to consider adjustments in an incremental manner to enhance 
the sustainability of the program while minimizing the public’s resistance. Such are the 
terms needed to reverse the establishment of a moral hazard. 
2. Enhancing Resiliency of the NFIP in the Era of Climate Change 
The United Kingdom has adopted legislation and incorporated policies into its 
national frameworks to address climate change as an emerging hazard. The United States 
should mirror the efforts utilized by the United Kingdom to map out the forecasted 
impacts of climate change and require communities to address the emerging hazard. 
                                                 
278 Beer and Hoffman, “Underwater,” 42.  
279 Michel-Kerjan, “Catastrophic Economics,” 416.  
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Current U.S. efforts have implemented some of these elements into recovery programs 
for Hurricane Sandy, such as a $50 billion investment to address climate change 
mitigation strategies. While a positive step, this effort also highlights the reactive nature 
of current U.S. policy. To require plans to be developed in advance will create a proactive 
framework for investment before disaster strikes. 
3. Areas for Future Research 
Given the NFIP’s substantial financial issues and other challenges, there is an 
extensive library of research available for review. While it is hoped that this thesis 
contributes to the analysis of the NFIP, further research of the program is warranted. For 
example, a 2010 floodplain management report published by the Association of State 
Floodplain Managers, identified evaluation of state floodplain management programs as a 
glaring deficiency.280 
Another area that warrants inquiry is the financial arrangement between the NFIP 
and WYO insurance services. A 2014 GAO report identifies that WYO expenses account 
for 12 percent and commissions account for 14 percent of NFIP premium expenses.281 
While these percentages may be reasonable, further evaluation may reveal alternatives to 
control these costs.  
                                                 
280 Association of State Floodplain Managers, Floodplain Management 2010: State and Local 
Programs (Washington, DC: Association of State Floodplain Managers, 2011), http://floods.org/ace-
files/Projects/FPM2010/FPM2010_Final_Report_Print.pdf, 60. 
281 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Forgone Premiums, 14. 
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APPENDIX A. FEMA DISASTER DECLARATION DATA 
FEMA disaster declaration data was compiled from the FEMA’s online disaster 
declaration database (https://www.fema.gov/disasters).282 The Stafford Act provides for 
major disaster declarations (incident that exceeds the capabilities of state and local 
governments) and emergency declarations (supplemental assistance to state and local 
governments).283 An extension of FEMA public assistance programs is the Fire 
Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) program, which provides financial assistance to 
assist in reimbursement for equipment, supplies, and personnel to any declared fire that 
meets the FMAG requirements.284 To get the results on Table 3, this researcher applied 
filters to the FEMA incident descriptions to determine natural hazard, non-natural hazard, 







                                                 
282 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations.”  
283 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fact Sheet: Disaster Declaration Process (Washington, 
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/media/factsheets/dad_disaster_declaration.pdf, 2.  
284 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire Management Assistance Grant Program Guide 





















































































































































































1953  13  13  0  6  46%  0  0  13 
1954  17  17  0  14  82%  0  0  17 
1955  18  18  0  15  83%  0  0  18 
1956  16  16  0  12  75%  0  0  16 
1957  16  16  0  15  94%  0  0  16 
1958  7  7  0  7  100%  0  0  7 
1959  7  7  0  7  100%  0  0  7 
1950s  94  94  0  76  81%  0  0  94 
1960  12  12  0  10  83%  0  0  12 
1961  12  12  0  11  92%  0  0  12 
1962  22  20  2  20  91%  0  0  22 
1963  20  20  0  19  95%  0  0  20 
1964  25  25  0  24  96%  0  0  25 
1965  25  25  0  20  80%  0  0  25 
1966  11  11  0  10  91%  0  0  11 
1967  11  11  0  10  91%  0  0  11 
1968  19  19  0  14  74%  0  0  19 
1969  29  29  0  29  100%  0  0  29 
1960s  186  184  2  167  90%  0  0  186 
1970  17  17  0  16  94%  0  2  19 
1971  17  17  0  12  71%  0  3  20 
1972  48  48  0  45  94%  0  0  48 
1973  46  46  0  43  93%  0  9  55 
                                                 


















































































































































































1974  46  46  0  43  93%  5  2  53 
1975  38  38  0  31  82%  6  1  45 
1976  30  30  0  27  90%  8  7  45 
1977  22  22  0  16  73%  34  5  61 
1978  25  25  0  24  96%  14  2  41 
1979  42  42  0  36  86%  10  7  59 
1970s  331  331  0  293  89%  77  38  446 
1980  23  23  0  20  87%  6  2  31 
1981  15  13  2  12  80%  0  3  18 
1982  24  24  0  21  88%  3  0  27 
1983  21  21  0  19  90%  1  2  24 
1984  34  34  0  26  76%  4  4  42 
1985  27  27  0  24  89%  0  9  36 
1986  28  28  0  28  100%  0  1  29 
1987  23  23  0  17  74%  1  7  31 
1988  11  11  0  7  64%  0  5  16 
1989  31  31  0  22  71%  0  1  32 
1980s  237  235  2  196  83%  15  34  286 
1990  38  38  0  32  84%  0  5  43 
1991  43  43  0  34  79%  0  2  45 
1992  45  44  1  33  73%  2  6  53 
1993  32  31  1  26  81%  19  7  58 
1994  36  36  0  21  58%  1  20  57 
1995  32  31  1  27  84%  2  4  38 
1996  75  75  0  54  72%  8  75  158 


















































































































































































1998  65  65  0  47  72%  9  54  128 
1999  50  50  0  39  78%  20  40  110 
1990s  460  457  3  346  75%  61  216  737 
2000  45  45  0  20  44%  6  63  114 
2001  45  43  2  27  60%  11  44  100 
2002  49  49  0  31  63%  0  70  119 
2003  56  56  0  39  70%  19  48  123 
2004  68  68  0  63  93%  7  43  118 
2005  48  48  0  40  83%  68  39  155 
2006  52  52  0  35  67%  5  86  143 
2007  63  63  0  45  71%  13  60  136 
2008  75  75  0  64  85%  17  51  143 
2009  59  59  0  43  73%  7  49  115 
2000s  560  558  2  407  73%  153  553  1266 
2010  81  81  0  53  65%  9  18  108 
2011  99  99  0  78  79%  29  114  242 
2012  47  47  0  34  72%  16  49  112 
2013  62  61  1  43  69%  5  28  95 
2014  45  45  0  32  71%  6  33  84 
2015  43  43  0  31  72%  2  34  79 
Totals  2245  2235  10  1756  78.2%  373  1117  3735 
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APPENDIX B. FEMA NFIP FLOOD ZONE DEFINITIONS 
The following zones (in Table 4) comprise the special flood hazard area (SFHA). 
FEMA defines these commonly used terms in floodplain management.286 
Table 4.   High-Risk Flood Areas 
ZONE DESCRIPTION 
A High hazard areas subject to inundation by the one percent annual 
chance flood event generally determined using approximate 
methodologies. Because detailed hydraulic analyses have not been 
performed, no base flood elevations or flood depths are shown. 
AE and A1-30 High hazard areas subject to inundation by the one percent annual 
chance flood event determined by detailed methods. Base flood 
elevations are shown. 
AH High hazard areas subject to inundation by one percent annual chance 
shallow flooding (usually areas of ponding) where average depths are 
between one and three feet. Base flood elevations are derived from 
detailed hydraulic analyses are shown in this zone. 
AO High hazard areas subject to inundation by one percent annual chance 
shallow flooding (usually sheet flow on sloping terrain) where average 
depths are between one and three feet. Average flood depths derived 
from detailed hydraulic analyses are shown in this zone. Some Zone 
AO have been designated in areas with high flood velocities such as 
alluvial fans and washes. Communities are encouraged to adopt more 
restrictive requirements for these areas. 
AR High hazard areas that result from the decertification of a previously 
accredited flood protection system that is determined to be in the 
process of being restored to provide base flood protection. 
                                                 




A99 High hazard areas subject to inundation by the one percent annual 
chance flood event, but which will ultimately be protected upon 
completion of an under-construction Federal flood protection system. 
These are areas of special flood hazard where enough progress has 
been made on the construction of a protection system, such as dikes, 
dams, and levees, to consider it complete for insurance rating purposes. 
Zone A99 may only be used when the flood protection system has 
reached specified statutory progress toward completion. No base flood 
elevations or depths are shown. 
V High hazard areas along coasts subject to inundation by the one 
percent-annual-chance flood event with additional hazards associated 
with storm-induced waves. Because detailed hydraulic analyses have 
not been performed, no base flood elevations or flood depths are 
shown. 
VE and V1-30 High hazard areas subject to inundation by the one percent annual 
chance flood event with additional hazards due to storm-induced 
velocity wave action. Base flood elevations are derived from detailed 
hydraulic analyses are shown. 
 
The following zones (in Table 5) comprise areas outside of the SFHA. FEMA 
defines these commonly used terms in floodplain management.287 
Table 5.   Moderate to Low Risk Flood Areas 
ZONE DESCRIPTION 
B or X Moderate hazard areas subject to inundation by the 0.2 percent annual 
chance flood event (500-year flood zone). Areas identified as moderate 
flood hazard are recommended to purchase flood insurance. 





                                                 
287 Ibid.  
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APPENDIX C. FEMA NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE CLAIM AND 
LOSS DATA (REPETITIVE LOSS COMPARISON) 
Table 6 provides a comparison of NFIP flood insurance claims and loss dollars 
paid between the full NFIP program and repetitive loss properties. 



























































































































1978  1,446,354  29,122  9,176  31.5%  $147,719,000  $76,676,217  51.9% 
1979  1,843,441  70,613  21,235  30.1%  $483,281,000  $219,743,242  45.5% 
1970s  99,735  30,411  30.5%  $631,000,000  $296,419,459  47.0% 
1980  2,103,851  41,918  15,750  37.6%  $230,414,000  $131,319,138  57.0% 
1981  1,915,065  23,261  7,639  32.8%  $127,118,000  $71,854,885  56.5% 
1982  1,900,544  32,831  13,520  41.2%  $198,296,000  $121,889,553  61.5% 
1983  1,981,122  51,584  20,617  40.0%  $439,455,000  $233,014,629  53.0% 
1984  1,926,388  27,688  9,814  35.4%  $254,643,000  $113,542,105  44.6% 
1985  2,016,785  38,676  14,117  36.5%  $368,239,000  $170,266,051  46.2% 
1986  2,119,039  13,789  5,686  41.2%  $126,385,000  $67,262,331  53.2% 
1987  2,115,183  13,400  5,906  44.1%  $105,432,000  $61,394,724  58.2% 
1988  2,149,153  7,758  3,740  48.2%  $51,023,000  $33,330,976  65.3% 
1989  2,292,947  36,245  14,077  38.8%  $661,658,000  $257,873,072  39.0% 
1980s  287,150  110,866  38.6%  $2,562,663,000  $1,261,747,464  49.2% 
1990  2,477,861  14,766  7,177  48.6%  $167,897,000  $97,386,942  58.0% 
1991  2,532,713  28,549  12,589  44.1%  $353,682,000  $190,264,875  53.8% 
1992  2,623,406  44,648  17,217  38.6%  $710,225,000  $308,285,133  43.4% 
                                                 
288 Adapted from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Policy & Claim Statistics;” FEMA 



























































































































1993  2,828,558  36,044  13,669  37.9%  $659,059,000  $273,273,143  41.5% 
1994  3,040,198  21,584  10,632  49.3%  $411,075,000  $226,476,161  55.1% 
1995  3,476,829  62,441  20,791  33.3%  $1,295,578,000  $538,817,089  41.6% 
1996  3,693,076  52,678  23,343  44.3%  $828,039,000  $465,331,421  56.2% 
1997  4,102,416  30,338  9,452  31.2%  $519,537,000  $179,297,721  34.5% 
1998  4,235,138  57,353  26,564  46.3%  $886,352,000  $504,077,505  56.9% 
1999  4,329,985  47,248  18,832  39.9%  $754,950,500  $397,183,092  52.6% 
1990s  395,649  160,266  40.5%  $6,586,394,500  $3,180,393,082  48.3% 
2000  4,369,087  16,362  6,096  37.3%  $251,721,000  $114,743,051  45.6% 
2001  4,458,470  43,601  15,921  36.5%  $1,276,957,000  $537,229,725  42.1% 
2002  4,519,799  25,347  14,244  56.2%  $433,649,000  $287,911,901  66.4% 
2003  4,565,491  36,931  15,290  41.4%  $780,776,000  $346,528,911  44.4% 
2004  4,667,446  55,908  22,898  41.0%  $2,232,421,000  $1,078,091,106  48.3% 
2005  4,962,011  213,587  41,114  19.2%  $17,770,118,000  $2,590,287,505  14.6% 
2006  5,514,895  24,629  12,827  52.1%  $640,797,000  $388,271,066  60.6% 
2007  5,655,919  23,189  12,439  53.6%  $614,014,000  $361,669,877  58.9% 
2008  5,684,275  74,907  21,121  28.2%  $3,487,967,000  $807,410,672  23.1% 
2009  5,700,235  31,033  14,955  48.2%  $779,898,000  $423,153,535  54.3% 
2000s  545,494  176,905  32.4%  $28,268,318,000  $6,935,297,349  24.5% 
2010  5,645,436  29,155  13,174  45.2%  $773,575,000  $338,757,540  43.8% 
2011  5,646,144  78,183  39,612  50.7%  $2,427,274,000  $1,275,904,553  52.6% 
2012  5,620,017  150,832  29,216  19.4%  $9,266,395,000  $1,904,871,322  20.6% 
2013  5,568,642  18,101  7,060  39.0%  $491,415,000  $199,825,828  40.7% 
2014  5,406,725  12,887  4,575  35.5%  $376,648,000  $140,309,235  37.3% 
2015  5,206,241  20,208  8,882  44.0%  $791,837,000  $367,508,767  46.4% 




APPENDIX D. FEMA NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE CLAIM AND 
LOSS DATA (SIGNIFICANT LOSS EVENTS COMPARISON) 
Table 7 provides a comparison of NFIP flood insurance claims and loss dollars 
paid between the full NFIP program and significant loss events. 






























































































































1978  29,122  3  11,424  39%  $147,719,000  $75,502,369  51% 
1979  70,613  8  33,281  47%  $483,281,000  $304,197,758  63% 
1970s  99,735  11  44,705  45%  $631,000,000  $379,700,127  60% 
1980  41,918  3  18,626  44%  $230,414,000  $120,889,969  52% 
1981  23,261  2  4,883  21%  $127,118,000  $34,372,935  27% 
1982  32,831  5  13,105  40%  $198,296,000  $89,713,741  45% 
1983  51,584  2  22,099  43%  $439,455,000  $224,222,522  51% 
1984  27,688  3  9,221  33%  $254,643,000  $88,087,128  35% 
1985  38,676  4  22121  57%  $368,239,000  $217,273,478  59% 
1986  13,789  1  2,003  15%  $126,385,000  $34,838,406  28% 
1987  13,400  0  0  0%  $105,432,000  0  0% 
1988  7,758  1  3,003  39%  $51,023,000  $17,124,219  34% 
1989  36,245  5  25,903  71%  $661,658,000  $563,179,707  85% 
1980s  287,150  26  120,964  42%  $2,562,663,000  $1,389,702,105  54% 
1990  14,766  0  0  0%  $167,897,000  0  0% 
1991  28,549  3  14,281  50%  $353,682,000  $208,698,143  59% 
1992  44,648  4  36,293  81%  $710,225,000  $596,307,287  84% 
                                                 
289 Adapted from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Policy & Claim Statistics;” Federal 






























































































































1993  36,044  2  20,312  56%  $659,059,000  $485,415,616  74% 
1994  21,584  1  6,226  29%  $411,075,000  $217,628,440  53% 
1995  62,441  3  45,096  72%  $1,295,578,000  $1,065,441,979  82% 
1996  52,678  8  39,565  75%  $828,039,000  $680,367,023  82% 
1997  30,338  2  11,927  39%  $519,537,000  $260,570,775  50% 
1998  57,353  9  37,570  66%  $886,352,000  $602,462,889  68% 
1999  47,248  2  34,121  72%  $754,950,500  $580,185,168  77% 
1990s  395,649  34  245,391  62%  $6,586,394,500  $4,697,077,320  71% 
2000  16,362  1  9,276  57%  $251,721,000  $158,283,182  63% 
2001  43,601  2  33,089  76%  $1,276,957,000  $1,139,831,924  89% 
2002  25,347  4  16,184  64%  $433,649,000  $311,366,397  72% 
2003  36,931  1  19,938  54%  $780,776,000  $500,265,018  64% 
2004  55,908  4  41,253  74%  $2,232,421,000  $1,944,634,409  87% 
2005  213,587  5  195,055  91%  $17,770,118,000  $17,323,459,933  97% 
2006  24,629  2  7,935  32%  $640,797,000  $266,554,094  42% 
2007  23,189  1  8,640  37%  $614,014,000  $225,928,476  37% 
2008  74,907  3  54,609  73%  $3,487,967,000  $2,953,956,144  85% 
2009  31,033  3  11,040  36%  $779,898,000  $354,639,962  45% 
2000s  545,494  26  397,019  73%  $28,268,318,000  $25,178,919,539  89% 
2010  29,155  2  14,210  49%  $773,575,000  $425,235,345  55% 
2011  78,183  5  62,804  80%  $2,427,274,000  $2,117,240,479  87% 
2012  150,832  3  144,045  96%  $9,266,395,000  $8,846,074,481  95% 
2013  18,101  2  5,126  28%  $491,415,000  $157,764,848  32% 
2014  12,887  1  2,137  17%  $376,648,000  $110,441,909  29% 
2015  20,208  3  12,605  62%  $791,837,000  $658,629,902  83% 




APPENDIX E. FEMA NFIP SIGNIFICANT FLOOD EVENTS 
FEMA significant flood event data was compiled from the FEMA’s online 
database (see Table 8). FEMA defines a “significant flood event” as an event, such as a 
major hurricane, with 1,500 or more paid losses or a flood event that is otherwise 
significant.290 














Massachusetts Flood Feb. 1978  February 78  2,202  $20,145,418  $9,149 
Louisiana Flood May 1978  May 78  7,343  $43,422,439  $5,913 
WV, IN, KY, OH Floods Dec 1978  December 78  1,879  $11,934,512  $6,352 
PA, CT, MA, NJ, NY, RI Floods  January 79  8,826  $31,487,015  $3,568 
ND, MN Floods  April 79  2,141  $10,360,266  $4,839 
Texas Flood April 1979  April 79  1,954  $20,131,418  $10,303 
Florida Flood April 1979  April 79  1,488  $2,029,163  $1,364 
Tropical Storm Claudette  July 79  9,664  $147,295,363  $15,242 
Hurricane Frederic  September 79  2,947  $45,809,311  $15,544 
Texas Flood September 1979  September 79  6,261  $47,085,222  $7,520 
NJ, CT and NY Floods April 1980  April 80  2,159  $7,156,481  $3,315 
Louisiana Flood April 1980  April 80  12,831  $86,279,354  $6,724 
Hurricane Allen  August 80  3,636  $27,454,134  $7,551 
Texas Flood Event June 1981  June 81  2,143  $13,414,893  $6,260 
Texas Flood August 1981  August 81  2,740  $20,958,042  $7,649 
Louisiana Flood April 1992  April 82  3,187  $20,785,522  $6,522 
RI, MA, CT Floods June 1982  June 82  2,189  $15,684,431  $7,165 
                                                 
290 Ibid. 
291 Adapted from: Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Policy & Claim Statistics;” Federal 















The “No‐Name Storm”  June 82  2,921  $10,474,435  $3,586 
MO, IL Floods December 1982  December 82  3,172  $29,851,938  $9,411 
Louisiana Flood December 1982  December 82  1,636  $12,917,415  $7,896 
Louisiana Flood April 1983  April 83  11,581  $104,833,841  $9,052 
Alicia  August 83  10,518  $119,388,681  $11,351 
New Jersey Flood March 1984  March 84  4,096  $22,163,537  $5,411 
New Jersey Flood April 1984  April 84  2,471  $33,300,119  $13,476 
Kentucky Flood May 1984  May 84  2,654  $32,623,472  $12,292 
Elena  August 85  8,234  $81,322,383  $9,876 
Gloria  September 85  6,088  $39,194,422  $6,438 
Isabel October 1985  October 85  1,612  $5,769,195  $3,579 
Juan  October 85  6,187  $90,987,478  $14,706 
California Flood February 1986  February 86  2,003  $34,838,406  $17,393 
Louisiana Flood April 1988  April 88  3,003  $17,124,219  $5,702 
Texas Flood May 1989  May 89  2,562  $59,020,120  $23,037 
Tropical Storm Allison 1989  June 89  3,127  $39,303,958  $12,569 
Hurricane Chantel  August 89  2,919  $39,510,677  $13,536 
Hugo  September 89  12,840  $376,433,739  $29,317 
Louisiana Flood November 1989  November 89  4,455  $48,911,213  $10,979 
Louisiana Flood June 1991  June 91  1,919  $15,832,141  $8,250 
Bob  August 91  2,821  $49,707,690  $17,621 
Halloween  October 91  9,541  $143,158,312  $15,005 
DE, NJ, PR Floods January 1992  January 92  3,211  $30,087,521  $9,370 
Texas Flood March 1992  March 92  2,353  $50,956,063  $21,656 
Andrew  August 92  5,587  $169,113,347  $30,269 
Nor’easter 1992  December 92  25,142  $346,150,356  $13,768 
March Storm  March 93  9,840  $212,596,101  $21,605 
Midwest Flood  June 93  10,472  $272,819,515  $26,052 
Texas Flood October 1994  October 94  6,226  $217,628,440  $34,955 















Louisiana Flood  May 95  31,343  $585,071,593  $18,667 
Opal  October 95  10,343  $405,527,543  $39,208 
Northeast Flood Jan 1996  January 96  12,523  $186,623,944  $14,902 
Northwest Flood  February 96  2,329  $61,903,974  $26,580 
Bertha  July 96  1,166  $10,388,364  $8,909 
Fran  September 96  10,315  $217,843,972  $21,119 
Hortense  September 96  1,382  $20,465,346  $14,808 
Josephine  October 96  6,512  $102,604,272  $15,756 
Northeast Flood Oct 1996  October 96  3,480  $40,837,392  $11,735 
California Flood December 1996  December 96  1,858  $39,699,759  $21,367 
South Central Flood  February 97  4,529  $100,469,721  $22,184 
Upper Midwest Flood  April 97  7,398  $160,101,054  $21,641 
Pineapple Express  January 98  4,227  $57,680,410  $13,646 
Nor'easter  February 98  3,212  $28,011,201  $8,721 
Hurricane Bonnie  August 98  2,675  $23,073,621  $8,626 
Texas Flood September 1998  September 98  4,876  $78,402,842  $16,079 
Louisiana Flood September 1998  September 98  5,176  $50,999,758  $9,853 
Hurricane Georges (Keys)  September 98  3,437  $43,208,306  $12,572 
Hurricane Georges  September 98  9,097  $154,169,745  $16,947 
Hurricane Georges (Panhandle)  September 98  1,679  $23,137,642  $13,781 
Texas Flood October 1998  October 98  3,191  $143,779,364  $45,058 
Hurricane Floyd  September 99  20,439  $462,326,389  $22,620 
Hurricane Irene  October 99  13,682  $117,858,779  $8,614 
Florida Flood October 2000  October 00  9,276  $158,283,182  $17,064 
Tropical Storm Allison 2001  June 01  30,671  $1,105,003,344  $36,028 
Tropical Storm Gabrielle  September 01  2,418  $34,828,580  $14,404 
Texas Flood July 2002  July 02  1,897  $70,901,720  $37,376 
Tropical Storm Isadore  September 02  8,467  $114,160,392  $13,483 
Hurricane Lili  September 02  2,569  $37,269,589  $14,507 















Hurricane Isabel  September 03  19,938  $500,265,018  $25,091 
Hurricane Charley  August 04  2,609  $50,914,481  $19,515 
Hurricane Frances  September 04  4,966  $153,488,029  $30,908 
Hurricane Ivan  September 04  28,297  $1,612,196,806  $56,974 
Hurricane Jeanne  September 04  5,381  $128,035,093  $23,794 
Hurricane Dennis  July 05  3,808  $119,867,428  $31,478 
Hurricane Katrina  August 05  167,984  $16,318,248,752  $97,142 
Hurricane Rita  September 05  9,529  $474,740,062  $49,821 
Tropical Storm Tammy  October 05  4,116  $44,773,505  $10,878 
Hurricane Wilma  October 05  9,618  $365,830,186  $38,036 
PA, NJ, NY Floods June 2006  June 06  6,428  $229,292,230  $35,671 
Hurricane Paul  October 06  1,507  $37,261,864  $24,726 
Nor'easter April 2007  April 07  8,640  $225,928,476  $26,149 
Torrential Rain June 2008  June 08  3,405  $144,684,258  $42,492 
Hurricane Gustav  September 08  4,544  $112,393,983  $24,735 
Hurricane Ike  September 08  46,660  $2,696,877,903  $57,798 
Torrential Rain March 2009 TX  March 09  3,303  $127,530,808  $38,611 
Torrential Rain Sept 2009 GA  September 09  2,067  $124,241,069  $60,107 
Tropical Storm IDA VA  November 09  5,670  $102,868,085  $18,143 
2010 Nor’easter  March 10  10,094  $194,837,326  $19,302 
Torrential Rain TN  April 10  4,116  $230,398,019  $55,976 
Torrential Rain NJ  March 11  1,873  $36,428,863  $19,449 
Mid‐Spring Storms  April 11  4,342  $145,807,074  $33,581 
Late‐Spring Storms  June 11  2,433  $134,607,082  $55,326 
Hurricane Irene  August 11  44,266  $1,339,910,797  $30,270 
Tropical Storm Lee  September 11  9,890  $460,486,663  $46,561 
Tropical Storm Debbie  June 12  1,792  $42,694,074  $23,825 
Tropical Storm Isaac  August 12  12,039  $554,103,065  $46,026 
Superstorm Sandy  October 12  130,214  $8,249,277,342  $63,352 















Colorado Flooding Sept 2013  September 13  1,732  $68,562,621  $39,586 
Florida Flooding April 2014  April 14  2,137  $110,441,909  $51,681 
Texas Flooding May Jun 2015  May 15  6,687  $446,484,271  $66,769 
South Carolina Flooding Oct 2015  October 15  3,836  $131,413,037  $34,258 
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